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A BROAD ATTACK ON OVERBREADTH 
Luke Meier∗ 
Under the free speech overbreadth doctrine,1 a litigant is allowed to 
bring a facial challenge to a statute despite the fact that the application of 
the statute to the litigant under the facts of the case does not violate the 
Constitution.2  The litigant argues that the entire statute should be struck 
down because the statute could be applied unconstitutionally in certain 
hypothetical fact patterns. 
The overbreadth doctrine is a dramatic departure from “the 
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication.”3  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that “constitutional rights are personal and 
may not be asserted vicariously.”4  However, under the overbreadth 
doctrine a litigant is allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute even if the application of the statute to the litigant does not 
violate the litigant’s personal constitutional rights.5  Furthermore, courts 
typically avoid, if possible, considering the constitutionality of a statute 
on its face.6  Yet, under the overbreadth doctrine courts aggressively 
                                                 
∗ J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 2000.  I would like to thank Douglas Linder 
for his comments and assistance. 
1 The doctrine is often referred to as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.  
However, because the doctrine applies only to the Free Speech Clause and not the other 
provisions of the First Amendment, this Article will use the label “free speech overbreadth 
doctrine” or simply “overbreadth doctrine.” 
2 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (“Litigants, therefore, are 
permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are 
violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence 
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or 
expression.”). 
3 Id. at 610. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 610–12. 
6 See, e.g, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (“Because we find that Title II 
unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the 
accessibility of judicial services, we need go no further.”); see also Nat’l Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (“Facial invalidation ‘is, manifestly, strong medicine’ 
that ‘has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.’” (quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613)); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 
(1990) (noting that facial invalidation of a statute is disfavored); New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (“[T]he Court’s practice when confronted with ordinary criminal laws 
that are sought to be applied against protected conduct is not to invalidate the law in toto, 
but rather to reverse the particular conviction.”).  But see Richard Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2000) (claiming that 
facial invalidation is more common than previously thought); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming 
Overbreadth:  Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 421–56 
(1998) (noting that the doctrine used by the courts in considering equal protection 
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pursue the opportunity to consider whether the statute in question 
should be struck down in its entirety, even though the case could 
theoretically be decided by ruling that the litigant’s constitutional right 
to freedom of speech was not violated.  Finally, although there is 
presently much discussion over the proper standard for a court to apply 
when it considers a facial attack on a statute,7 it is clear that the standard 
used by the courts in considering a facial attack under the overbreadth 
doctrine is substantially different than the normal standard for facial 
challenges.8 
Since the relatively recent adoption of the free speech overbreadth 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has struggled to apply the doctrine, often 
attempting to limit the doctrine by enacting various limitations on when 
it should be applied.9  Meanwhile, academic commentators have 
generally applauded the doctrine;10 some have even proposed that the 
doctrine be extended to cases involving other constitutional rights 
beyond freedom of speech.11  There is extensive debate, both in the 
courts and by commentators, over whether the Supreme Court has 
already extended the overbreadth doctrine to abortion cases.12  Recently, 
the Court seemed to concede that it has applied an overbreadth analysis 
in contexts outside the Free Speech Clause.13  There has been no 
academic discussion calling for the Supreme Court to abandon the 
overbreadth doctrine.  That is the purpose of this Article. 
                                                                                                             
challenges to statutes often requires the courts to consider the constitutionality of the 
statute on its face). 
7 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 239 (1994) (“[C]ontrary to what Salerno proclaims, no single legal standard controls the 
judgment of facial challenges in practice.”). 
8 See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) (“The First Amendment doctrine of 
overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial 
challenges.”). 
9 Cf.  Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 587 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (accusing 
the plurality of attempting to limit the overbreadth doctrine by illegitimate means). 
10 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 7, at 261 (explaining that the overbreadth doctrine has been 
applied outside the context of the Speech Clause and applauding this extension). 
11 See, e.g., John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53, 92 
(2004) (advocating the use of the overbreadth doctrine in cases involving rights other than 
speech rights). 
12 See id. at 92 (stating that the Casey Court extended the overbreadth doctrine into the 
abortion context); Kevin Martin, Note, Stranger in a Strange Land:  The Use of Overbreadth in 
Abortion Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 173 (1999) (also stating that the Casey Court 
extended the overbreadth doctrine into the abortion context). 
13 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004) (citing cases in which an 
overbreadth analysis was used). 
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For the most part, the arguments herein are pragmatic.  The central 
thesis of this Article is that the overbreadth doctrine fails to achieve the 
goals to which it aspires and that the doctrine simply does not work.  
Moreover, the doctrine has unintended and undesirable consequences 
regarding the contemporary understanding of the judicial function.  
Despite the pragmatic approach taken in this Article, there exist more 
fundamental objections to the overbreadth doctrine.  It is easy to 
conceive of convincing arguments that the overbreadth doctrine extends 
beyond the judicial power, described in Article III of the Constitution, to 
decide “cases” and “controversies.”14  However, approximately sixty 
years of jurisprudence recognizing the overbreadth doctrine dictates that 
the time for those arguments has passed.  There is simply too much 
water under the bridge for the Supreme Court to now consider the 
constitutionality of the doctrine, even if both the Court and 
commentators have failed to explore and consider the compelling 
arguments against its constitutionality.15 Conversely, there does not 
seem to be a legitimate argument that the free speech overbreadth 
doctrine is required under the Constitution.  The Supreme Court has 
never intimated as much,16 and although one commentator has 
attempted to portray the overbreadth doctrine as a constitutional 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the power to declare a statute facially unconstitutional is inconsistent with 
the role of courts articulated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)); New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 767 n.20 (1982) (stating that the”traditional rule [] that a person to whom a 
statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it 
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court,” 
which the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to, reflected the personal nature of 
constitutional rights, prudential limitations on constitutional adjudications, and “Art. III 
limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies”); Lewis v. City 
of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 137 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The result [of the 
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines] is that we are not merely applying constitutional 
limitations, as was intended by the Framers, and, indeed, as the history of our 
constitutional adjudication indicates, but are invalidating state statutes in wholesale lots 
because they ‘conceivably might apply to others who might utter other words.’” (quoting 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 535 (1972)). 
15 See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules:  The Moral Structure of American 
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 144 (1998) (“But the dispute about the scope of 
overbreadth—among the Justices and among constitutional scholars writing in this area—
has generally taken for granted the permissibility of some such doctrine, under Article III.”). 
16 Indeed, language used in some Supreme Court opinions discussing the doctrine 
seems to foreclose any argument that the doctrine is constitutionally required.  See, e.g., 
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) 
(“Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected 
expression.”); cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (stating the overbreadth 
doctrine is “strong medicine” and “has been employed by the Court sparingly”). 
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requirement,17 the Court has rejected this effort.18  Thus, the doctrine is 
best understood as a discretionary tool used by the judiciary pursuant to 
its power to decide cases and controversies.  As such, it seems entirely 
proper to consider whether the doctrine’s continued viability is 
warranted, which is the purpose of this Article. 
Part I of this Article attempts to precisely describe the overbreadth 
doctrine.  To do this, I first introduce a general framework for 
considering First Amendment cases.  This framework is necessary to 
understand the contributions of the overbreadth doctrine to First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  I advance the claim that courts typically use 
two basic models or methods in deciding free speech cases, and I have 
termed these two models the Statutory Model and the Speech Model.  
Having established this general framework, the analysis proceeds to 
delineate the characteristics, or contributions, of the overbreadth 
doctrine.  There are two:  (1) the overbreadth doctrine allows litigants to 
assert the constitutional rights of others not before the court and (2) the 
overbreadth doctrine permits a court to consider a facial challenge to a 
statute by using a method of analysis previously reserved for as-applied 
challenges. 
Part II of this Article examines whether the overbreadth doctrine 
achieves the dual goals to which it aspires:  (1) preventing the chilling of 
constitutionally protected speech and (2) encouraging the legislative 
branch to be cognizant of free speech issues when drafting legislation.  I 
present two conclusions:  (1) that the overbreadth doctrine rarely 
prevents the chilling of constitutional speech and (2) that the doctrine is 
unnecessary to encourage the legislative branch to operate with an 
awareness of free speech rights. 
In Part III, I explore the negative consequences of the overbreadth 
doctrine.  I advance the claim that the overbreadth doctrine is largely 
responsible for the current confusion on the Supreme Court concerning 
when facial challenges are appropriate and what standard to apply when 
considering a facial challenge to a statute.  The Court has recently 
                                                 
17 See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1981).  
Professor Monaghan argues that the overbreadth doctrine should not be thought of as an 
exception to the normal rules regarding the personal nature of constitutional rights and the 
prohibition on the assertion of others’ rights, but as an application of the principle that a 
litigant has a right to be judged by a constitutionally valid rule of law.  See id. at 1–14. 
18 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (reaffirming that facial challenges to 
statutes are disfavored); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 
853, 871–75 (1991) (explaining that Monaghan’s account of the overbreadth doctrine fails to 
“hold up” to existing Supreme Court case law). 
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struggled with several questions that require a clear understanding of 
the judicial function because the overbreadth doctrine has injected 
confusion into the common understanding of the proper role of courts 
and judges.  The argument continues that, in order to resolve this 
controversy, the Supreme Court should abandon the overbreadth 
doctrine before the doctrine is applied to other areas of constitutional 
rights and the proper understanding of the judicial function is further 
blurred. 
I.  WHAT IS THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE? 
A. First Amendment Doctrinal Background 
In order to understand exactly what the overbreadth doctrine is and 
how it operates, it is necessary to have a general framework for the 
methods that courts use to decide free speech cases.  Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to identify a unified theory for how courts decide free speech 
cases.  Freedom of speech issues arise in so many different and unique 
circumstances that it is impossible to simplify this area of the law into a 
few easy rules and tests that can be mechanically applied to different 
factual scenarios.19  Any professor who has taught a First Amendment 
course, or any student who has taken such a course, is aware of this 
complexity. 
Fortunately, this Article requires only a general framework.  The 
framework I suggest involves two models for constitutional cases 
involving free speech rights.20  The models are a descriptive account of 
the two methods by which courts adjudicate cases involving free speech 
rights.  Under one model, the court is primarily concerned with the 
statute in question; under the other model, the court focuses upon the 
particular speech involved in the case. 
The first model will be labeled the “Statutory Model.”  Under the 
Statutory Model, the court first determines whether the defendant 
engaged in expressive activity that is protected under the First 
Amendment.  In almost all instances, this initial inquiry will be brief and 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 
883 n.3 (1991) (“Free speech is an exceptionally complicated field of law.”). 
20 Of course, the application of statutes or regulations is not the only manner in which 
free speech issues are raised.  However, because the overbreadth doctrine deals specifically 
with statutes, the background framework I propose likewise focuses solely on statutes and 
regulations. 
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elementary.21  The Statutory Model analysis then turns to the statute in 
question.  The court broadly analyzes the ends sought to be achieved by 
the legislature and whether the means employed by the statute are 
sufficiently tied to the legitimate goals of the legislature.  The importance 
of the government interest asserted and the “fit” between the means 
employed in the statute to achieve that goal varies.22  If either the end to 
be achieved or the means employed is not sufficient, the court strikes 
down the statute in its entirety as a violation of the First Amendment.  In 
effect, the court places itself in the position of the legislature, weighing 
the importance of the policy objective to be achieved and asking whether 
that goal could have been achieved by a statute drafted with more care 
for free speech rights.  The defendant’s speech is almost inconsequential 
to the analysis once the court answers the initial question regarding 
whether there has been expressive activity that is protected by the First 
Amendment.23 
                                                 
21 The only expressive activities not protected by the First Amendment involve fighting 
words, obscenity, certain types of libel, and pornographic material featuring minors.  In 
addition, the Court’s opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), casts doubt on 
whether these categories of speech are completely outside the First Amendment. 
22 For instance, when the government prohibits speech on the basis of content or 
viewpoint discrimination, the restriction must be necessary to the achievement of a 
compelling government interest.  See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.  However, content-neutral 
regulations concerning the time, place, and manner of speech in public parks need only be 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.  See Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
23 In some Court opinions using the Statutory Model, there is terminology that might 
suggest that the overbreadth doctrine is being employed.  See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 
478 U.S. 697, 701 (1986) (“[We] determined that the closure remedy failed the fourth part of 
the O’Brien test, which requires that the statute incidentally restricting speech be no 
broader than necessary to achieve its purpose.”).  However, as this Article demonstrates, 
the overbreadth doctrine is conceptually distinct from the Statutory Model even though the 
terms “overbroad” or “broad” might show up in cases decided under either analysis.  
Under the Statutory Model, the court places itself in the position of the legislature to 
determine whether it could have achieved the legislature’s goals while doing less harm to 
freedom of speech by writing a different statute.  The analysis is focused solely on the 
language of the statute and whether the language is “too broad” in light of assumed 
legislative objectives.  In addition, only those who have engaged in constitutionally 
protected speech can bring a challenge to a statute using the Statutory Model.  As this 
Article subsequently explains, under the overbreadth doctrine, a court focuses not on 
whether the statute could have been better written but on the ratio of constitutional 
applications of the statute versus the number of unconstitutional applications of the statute.  
The court does not hypothesize about how it might have drafted the statute.  Rather, it 
ascertains whether the statute, as written, fails to meet a certain ratio between 
constitutional and unconstitutional applications.  In addition, under the overbreadth 
doctrine the court will consider challenges to a statute even if the litigant has not herself 
engaged in constitutionally protected speech.  Thus, although courts might sometimes use 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/4
2005] Broad Attack on Overbreadth 119 
There are numerous examples where the Supreme Court uses the 
Statutory Model to strike down or uphold a statute.  In Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton,24 Jehovah Witnesses brought a 
challenge to a village ordinance prohibiting door-to-door advocacy 
without first applying for and receiving a permit from the village’s 
mayor.25  After establishing that the Jehovah Witnesses’ speech was a 
constitutionally protected expression under the First Amendment,26 the 
Court proceeded to analyze the three interests asserted by the town 
justifying the statute:  (1) protection of residents’ privacy, (2) prevention 
of crime, and (3) prevention of fraud.27  Although the Court conceded 
that each of these interests was important, the Court nevertheless struck 
down the statute because it determined that either the government 
interest was not advanced by the regulation or there were less restrictive 
means available to the village to achieve its goals.28 
The Statutory Model was also used in the famous case of United 
States v. O’Brien,29 but with different results.  In O’Brien, the Supreme 
Court considered the conviction of an anti-war protestor who had 
burned his draft card in violation of a federal law prohibiting the 
destruction or mutilation of draft cards.30  After assuming that the 
defendant’s act of burning a draft card constituted expression protected 
by the First Amendment, the Court proceeded to examine the supposed 
objectives of Congress in passing the law.31  The Court determined that 
these objectives were substantial and that the law furthered these 
objectives in a precise and narrow manner.32  Thus, the statute and 
conviction were upheld. 
These examples should sufficiently illustrate the Statutory Model.  
Those familiar with First Amendment law, Equal Protection law, and 
                                                                                                             
the term “overbroad” in either analysis, it is important to distinguish these two different 
analyses. 
24 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
25 See id. at 153. 
26 See id. at 164. 
27 See id. at 168–69. 
28 See id. 
29 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
30 See id. at 369–71. 
31 See id. at 378–81.  In O’Brien, the Court noted that the expressive activity by O’Brien 
was not pure speech but that it was expressive conduct.  See id. at 375.  Thus, the Court took 
a more deferential approach to the importance of the government interest and the 
relationship between that interest and the statute in question than the government was 
required to demonstrate.  See id. at 376–75.  However, for purposes of this Article, the 
standard of scrutiny is irrelevant.  The important point is the type of analysis used. 
32 See id. at 381. 
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many other areas of constitutional adjudication33 will have seen it used 
many times by courts.34  The same is true of the competing model of free 
speech analysis, which will be called the “Speech Model.”  Unlike the 
Statutory Model, which focuses upon the statute or regulation in 
question, the Speech Model focuses on the particular aspects of the 
speech under the facts before the court.  This is not to say that a court 
deciding a free speech case under the Speech Model ignores the asserted 
government interests behind the statute.  However, instead of broadly 
considering these interests in a vacuum, the court focuses on the 
particular facts of the case and determines whether the government’s 
interest applies to the defendant’s actual speech. 
Under the Statutory Model, the issue before the court is always 
whether a particular statute is constitutional.35  Under the Speech Model, 
courts frame the issue in several different ways.  First, the court 
sometimes frames the issue as whether the government has a compelling 
interest to apply a statute to the particular speech engaged in by the 
defendant.36  Second, the court may phrase the issue as whether the 
defendant has a constitutional right to engage in the particular speech 
that prompted the lawsuit.37  Third, the court might define the issue as 
whether the conviction resulted in a denial of the defendant’s First 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707, 735 (1997) (using the Statutory 
Method to uphold a Washington statute prohibiting suicide assistance); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (using the Statutory Method to strike down an Oklahoma statute that 
restricted the sale of beer to minor males, finding that the sex-based distinction made in the 
statute was not substantially related to the achievement of the statutory objective and thus 
violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
34 In a very recent Supreme Court case, the Court used the Statutory Method to uphold 
an injunction against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, reasoning that the 
means Congress used to protect children from Internet pornography were not justified.  See 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792–93 (2004). 
35 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (framing the issue as whether a 
Virginia statute banning cross burning with an intent to intimidate was unconstitutional 
and concluding that it was). 
36 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (concluding that New 
Jersey did not have sufficient interest to justify infringement of Boy Scouts’ First 
Amendment right to exclude homosexual scout leaders); City Council of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816–17 (1984) (holding that Los Angeles had a 
substantial interest in applying its prohibition on the placement of private signs on public 
property to the defendants); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (considering 
whether the State of Washington had persuasive reasons to apply a flag misuse statute to a 
college student who hung a United States flag with an attached peace symbol outside his 
apartment). 
37 See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (concluding that protestors had no 
constitutional right to continue protesting on jail grounds after they had been asked to 
leave). 
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Amendment rights.38  A few examples should illustrate the Speech 
Model. 
The Supreme Court considered the conviction of a college student 
for displaying a privately owned American flag outside his apartment in 
Spence v. Washington.39  The student had attached a peace symbol on the 
flag using removable black tape.40  The student was charged with 
violating a Washington statute that prevented a picture or design from 
being placed on a U.S. flag.41  The Court first explained that the student’s 
activity in displaying the flag with a peace symbol attached was 
symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment.42  Next, the 
Court considered the asserted state interests.  However, instead of 
broadly considering the justifications for the statute to determine if these 
interests were sufficient and properly narrowed, the Court determined 
whether the “various state interests . . . might . . . support the challenged 
conviction. . . .”43  The Court concluded that Washington’s interest in 
preventing a breach of the peace could not justify the conviction because 
there was no support in the record for the notion that the defendant’s 
symbolic speech resulted in, or was likely to cause, a breach of the 
peace.44  The Court did not broadly consider whether Washington’s 
interest in preventing breaches of the peace was sufficient or whether the 
statute was properly limited to that goal.  Instead, the Court determined 
that the particular speech involved in this case was not likely to cause a 
breach of the peace.  Washington’s asserted interest was not implicated 
on these facts.  Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction.45 
The Court’s opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale46 is another good 
example of the Speech Model.  In Dale, the Court considered whether the 
application of New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, which had 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969) (stating that the issue before the 
Court was “whether, in light of all the circumstances, th[e] conviction denied to [the 
defendant] rights of free expression protected by the First Amendment . . .”). 
39 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 406. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 407. 
42 See id. at 410. 
43 Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
44 See id. at 414–15. 
45 Id. at 415.  It seems likely that if the Court had used the Statutory Model and broadly 
considered the Washington statute, it would have struck down the statute.  Thus, the 
conviction in this case was going to be reversed regardless of whether the Court used the 
Statutory Model to strike down the entire statute or whether the Court simply reversed the 
conviction by using the Speech Model.  However, as this Article demonstrates, sometimes 
the model used will affect the outcome of the case. 
46 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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been interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court to prevent the Boy 
Scouts from excluding Dale based on his homosexuality, violated the 
Boy Scouts’ First Amendment rights.47  The Court determined that the 
Boy Scouts’ rights had been violated under the facts of the case.48  The 
Court devoted most of its opinion to determining whether the Boy 
Scouts engaged in expressive activity and whether the forced inclusion 
of a homosexual would “significantly affect” this expression.49  After 
resolving this preliminary issue, the Court next turned to the asserted 
government interests behind the New Jersey statute, but it did not 
broadly consider these interests.50  Rather, the Court specifically asked 
whether New Jersey’s interests justified the specific intrusion on the Boy 
Scouts’ free speech rights, and it concluded that they did not.51  The 
Court did not strike down the New Jersey statute, but it held that New 
Jersey could not, pursuant to the state statute, force the inclusion of Dale 
under the specific facts of the case.52  
The Supreme Court also used the Speech Model in Adderley v. 
Florida.53  In Adderley, the Supreme Court considered the trespass 
convictions of thirty-two students who were arrested while protesting at 
the county jail.54  In an opinion confirming the convictions, the Supreme 
Court recounted in great detail the facts leading to the trespass 
conviction.  The Court described how the sheriff had asked the 
protestors to leave county property many times before actually arresting 
the protestors.55  The Court did not examine the purported reasons for 
Florida’s trespass law, nor did it examine whether those goals were 
implicated on the facts of the case.56  The Court concluded that the 
protestors had no constitutional right to continue protesting on jail 
grounds after they had been asked to leave.57  There are numerous other 
examples of the Speech Model,58 but these three examples should suffice 
                                                 
47 See id. at 644. 
48 See id. at 661. 
49 See id. at 647–56. 
50 See id. at 656–61. 
51 See id. at 659 (“The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations 
law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive 
association.”). 
52 Of course, the reasoning and precedent established in Dale might limit future 
applications of the statute. 
53 385 U.S. 39 (1967). 
54 See id. at 40. 
55 See id. at 47. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (reversing Johnson’s conviction for 
burning an American flag in violation of Texas law); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 
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to demonstrate its characteristics and distinguish it from the Statutory 
Model.   
In many instances, the result in an individual case will not depend 
on whether the court uses the Speech or Statutory Model to decide the 
case.  For instance, in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,59 
the Court considered whether a political candidate had a First 
Amendment right to post political campaign signs on public property in 
violation of a Los Angeles ordinance preventing the posting of signs on 
all property.60  The Court used the Speech Model to determine that Los 
Angeles could apply the sign ordinance to Vincent’s political signs 
without violating the First Amendment.61 
The result in Vincent would likely have been exactly the same had 
the Court used the Statutory Model.  The speech before the Court was 
political speech,62 which is at the heart of the First Amendment and 
generally deserves more First Amendment protection than other types of 
speech.63  In addition, the Court noted testimony in the record that the 
sign company involved did not place signs in any location that would 
implicate Los Angeles’ safety interest in enacting the ordinance,64 and 
that the sign company had developed “an expertise” in avoiding “visual 
blight” in the placement of the signs.65  It is difficult to imagine that the 
Court in Vincent would have reached a different conclusion in that case 
had it used the Statutory Model to broadly consider the aims of the 
statute.  The Court had before it the ideal factual scenario to hold that the 
First Amendment protected the speech, but it determined that Vincent’s 
constitutional rights were not violated by the application of the statute 
under the facts of the case.  Considering the statute broadly and 
generically, without reference to a specific fact pattern, would seem to 
require the same result in that case. 
                                                                                                             
(1951) (reversing Feiner’s disorderly conduct conviction for continuing to give an address 
on a street corner after being asked three times to stop by police who were trying to break 
up a crowd). 
59 466 U.S. 789, 791–92 (1984). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 816–17. 
62 See id. at 792–93. 
63 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“The Court’s opinion does not question the constitutional importance of political speech or 
that its protection lies at the heart of the First Amendment.”). 
64 See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 802. 
65 Id. 
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However, there are instances where it appears that the Court’s 
decision to use the Statutory or Speech Model is determinative.  For 
instance, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,66 the Supreme Court used the Statutory 
Model to strike down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act.67  The Court 
reasoned that the Act failed to distinguish between mere advocacy of 
unlawful action, which is constitutionally protected under the First 
Amendment, and direct incitement of imminent lawless action that is 
likely to produce such action, which is not constitutionally protected.68  
Thus, because the statute was not narrowly drafted to only reach speech 
that was not constitutionally protected, the Court struck down the 
statute.  The Court’s opinion devotes very little attention to the actual 
speech involved in this case, which was a speech made at a Klu Klux 
Klan rally in which the speaker indicated the possibility of 
“reveangeance” being taken against the President, Congress, and the 
Supreme Court.69  The Court made no indication whether the speech 
qualified as “mere advocacy” or whether the speech constituted a direct 
incitement to imminent lawless action that was likely to produce such 
action.70  Rather, because it was not drafted as narrowly as possible to 
achieve its legitimate goals, it was struck down as unconstitutional.  
Brandenberg can be compared with Schenck v. United States.71  Schenck 
involved a prosecution under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, which 
prohibited obstructing “the recruiting and enlistment service of the 
United States” and causing “insubordination [] in the military and naval 
forces of the United States.”72  The defendants had printed a circular that 
attacked the draft and capitalism.73  Announcing the Supreme Court’s 
then-accepted standard for subversive speech cases, Justice Holmes 
asked whether “the words used are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger” that they will 
cause unlawful action.74  Justice Holmes, using the Speech Model, 
determined that in this case the particular facts regarding the language 
of the circular and where the circular was distributed constituted a “clear 
                                                 
66 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
67 See id. at 448–49. 
68 See id. at 447–49. 
69 See id. at 446. 
70 The Court did comment that the trial judge’s instruction to the jury failed to 
distinguish between mere advocacy and direct incitement likely to cause imminent lawless 
action.  See id. at 449 n.3.  It appears that the Court referenced the trial judge’s jury 
instruction as an illustration that the statute had not been construed by Ohio courts to 
prohibit conviction for mere advocacy. 
71 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
72 Id. at 49. 
73 See id. at 50–51. 
74 See id. at 52. 
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and present danger.”75  However, if Justice Holmes had used the 
Statutory Model and broadly considered whether the statute was 
narrowly drafted to achieve its goals, the statute and the conviction 
would likely have been overturned.  The statute was not limited by 
language requiring a clear and present danger.  Thus the statute in 
Schenck suffered from the same defect as the statute considered in 
Brandenburg. 
It is not necessary for present purposes to attempt a descriptive 
account of when the Supreme Court has used the Speech Model and 
when the Court has used the Statutory Model.  Nor is it necessary to 
provide a normative framework for when these two competing models 
should be used.  It is only necessary to recognize that there are, in fact, 
two basic models by which the Supreme Court adjudicates constitutional 
free speech claims involving a statute. 
By now, the discerning reader may well believe that the Statutory 
and Speech Models are simply new labels for facial and as-applied 
challenges to statutes.  An as-applied challenge to a statute is, after all, 
simply the assertion that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to 
a litigant under particular facts of a case.  In this sense, an as-applied 
challenge is the same as the Speech Model of adjudication.  Similarly, 
when a court uses the Statutory Model and strikes down a statute, it is 
holding the statute facially unconstitutional.  Thus, the Statutory Model 
of adjudication and a facial challenge to a statute seem closely related, if 
not identical. 
Yet, in order to truly understand the overbreadth doctrine and how 
it operates, it is important to understand the difference between the 
Statutory and Speech Models and as-applied and facial challenges.  The 
Statutory and Speech Models are theories of adjudication.  They explain 
how judges analyze cases involving freedom of speech issues.  In other 
words, the Statutory and Speech Models represent two methods by which 
a court analyzes a free speech case.  As-applied and facial challenges are 
not descriptive methods for how courts decide free speech cases.  In one 
sense, presenting an as-applied or facial challenge is merely a litigation 
choice made by a party.  Either the party can decide to challenge the 
statute’s application under the particular circumstances of the case or the 
party can decide to challenge a statute on its face.  In another sense, 
references to as-applied and facial challenges are merely descriptions of 
a court’s opinion.  When a court sustains a facial challenge to a statute, 
                                                 
75 See id. 
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the statute is invalid and future attempts at enforcement under any 
circumstances are futile.  However, when a court sustains an as-applied 
challenge, future litigation under the statute is possible, and litigants are 
free to argue that their facts are similar to, or unlike, the facts under 
which the court upheld the as-applied challenge to the statute. 
However one understands as-applied and facial challenges, either as 
a litigation choice made by a litigant or as terms that identify the result of 
a court’s holding, as-applied and facial challenges tell us nothing about 
the method a court uses in resolving a case.  This is the realm of the 
Speech and Statutory Models.  These Models deal with the two 
approaches or methods used to decide a free speech case. 
One may argue that it is not true that an as-applied challenge to a 
statute will always involve the Speech Model of adjudication and that a 
facial challenge to a statute will always involve the Statutory Model of 
adjudication.  However, while it is true that an as-applied challenge to a 
statute will always involve the Speech Model of adjudication, it is not 
true that a facial challenge to a statute will always involve the Statutory 
Model of adjudication.  A court will often use the Statutory Model of 
adjudication when resolving a facial challenge to a statute.  However, 
under the overbreadth doctrine a court may also use the Speech Model 
to resolve a facial challenge.  Indeed, this is one of the major 
contributions of the overbreadth doctrine, which will be demonstrated in 
Part I.B. 
To summarize, there are two methods by which courts can resolve 
free speech cases.  Under the Statutory Model, the court broadly 
examines the goals of the legislature, whether those goals are sufficient, 
and whether the means employed are properly related to legitimate 
ends.  The individual facts of the case are largely irrelevant to the 
analysis.  Under the Speech Model, the court looks at the speech in 
question and weighs the value of that speech against the government’s 
interest in regulating that speech.  This analysis is done only in regard to 
the specific facts before the court.  Somewhat related with the Statutory 
and Speech Models of adjudication are as-applied and facial challenges.  
As-applied and facial challenges represent the choice a litigant has 
regarding whether to challenge a statute on its face or whether to 
challenge a statute under the particular circumstances of the litigation. 
Therefore, the Statutory and Speech Models are descriptive accounts of 
the methods used by courts in resolving free speech cases.  As-applied 
and facial challenges refer to both the choice made by a litigant as to how 
to approach litigation and the effect of a court’s opinion.  As-applied and 
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facial challenges do not describe the method a court will use in analyzing 
a free speech case. 
B. What Does the Overbreadth Doctrine Contribute to Free Speech Doctrine? 
This Article now examines the two traits the overbreadth doctrine 
adds to free speech jurisprudence.  The first trait is that it allows 
litigants, whose own free speech rights have not been violated, to 
nevertheless challenge the constitutionality of a statute on its face.  The 
second trait is that it allows a court to consider a facial challenge to a 
statute on its face using the Speech Model of adjudication. 
1. The Overbreadth Doctrine:  An Exception to the Personal Nature of 
Constitutional Rights 
The Supreme Court and almost all commentators identify the 
Court’s opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama76 as the origin of the overbreadth 
doctrine.77  In Thornhill, the Supreme Court considered a conviction 
under an Alabama statute that prohibited loitering or picketing near or 
at a place of business.78  In the opinion, the Supreme Court announced 
that the issue before the Court was the facial validity of the statute.79  
Alabama had argued that the specific activity engaged in by Thornhill 
could be proscribed and, therefore, the Court would be allowing 
Thornhill to assert the constitutional rights of others if it ruled that the 
statute was unconstitutional on its face.80  Although the Court expressed 
doubt as to whether Thornhill’s activity could, in fact, be prohibited by 
Alabama,81 the Court nevertheless rejected the substance of Alabama’s 
arguments: 
Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has 
never been deemed a requisite for attack on the 
constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the 
                                                 
76 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
77 See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984) 
(“This ‘overbreadth’ doctrine has its source in Thornhill v. Alabama.”); Fallon, supra note 18, 
at 853 (citing Thornhill as the source of the overbreadth doctrine); Brendan D. Cummins, 
Note, The Thorny Path to Thornhill:  The Origins at Equity of the Free Speech Overbreadth 
Doctrine, 105 YALE L.J. 1671, 1671 (1996) (also citing Thornhill as the source of the 
overbreadth doctrine). 
78 See 310 U.S. at 91. 
79 See id. at 96 (stating that the statute “must be judged upon its face”). 
80 See id. 
81 See id.  “Even accepting the argument that one may not assert the constitutional rights 
of others, [i]t would not follow that on this record petitioner could not complain of the 
sweeping regulations here challenged.”  Id. 
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dissemination of ideas. . . .  An accused . . . does not have 
to sustain the burden of demonstrating that the State 
could not constitutionally have written a different and 
specific statute covering his activities as disclosed by the 
charge and the evidence introduced against him.  Where 
regulations of the liberty of free discussion are 
concerned, there are special reasons for observing the 
rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the 
evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of 
permissible conduct and warns against transgression.82 
Another opinion that demonstrates the first characteristic of the 
overbreadth doctrine is Gooding v. Wilson.83  The Supreme Court used the 
overbreadth doctrine in Gooding to strike down a Georgia statute 
prohibiting the use of “opprobrious” and “abusive” language.84  The 
conviction had occurred when an anti-war protestor was arrested for 
stating the following to a police officer:  “‘You son of a bitch, I’ll choke 
you to death’” and “‘White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you.’”85  Under 
Supreme Court doctrine, language constituting “fighting words” is 
completely outside the scope of the First Amendment.86  It seems clear 
that the racial threats involved in Gooding would have qualified as 
fighting words that did not deserve First Amendment protection.  
However, in Gooding the Court used the overbreadth doctrine to 
contemplate whether the statute should be struck down because it could 
be applied to speech that was constitutionally protected, i.e., speech that 
did not constitute fighting words.87  The Court ultimately struck down 
the statute in its entirety.88 
Gooding and Thornhill represent the first important aspect of the 
overbreadth doctrine:  It allows a litigant whose speech is either 
completely outside the First Amendment’s protection, such as the 
fighting words used in Gooding, or whose speech “might have been 
constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn 
statute”89 to nevertheless challenge the statute in question.  Thus, under 
the overbreadth doctrine, there is no requirement that the litigant 
                                                 
82 Id. at 97–98 (citations omitted). 
83 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
84 Id. at 519. 
85 Id. at 520 n.1. 
86 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
87 See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520–21. 
88 See id. at 528. 
89 Id. at 520. 
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demonstrate that his own constitutional rights have been violated.  
Therefore, the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the Court’s 
traditional rules regarding standing:90  
In the First Amendment context, we permit defendants 
to challenge statutes on overbreadth ground, regardless 
of whether the individual defendant’s conduct is 
constitutionally protected.  “The First Amendment 
doctrine of substantial overbreadth is an exception to the 
general rule that a person to whom a statute may be 
constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on 
the grounds that it may be unconstitutionally applied to 
others.”91 
2. The Overbreadth Doctrine:  Using the Speech Model of Adjudication 
To Resolve Facial Challenges 
Another trait attributed to the overbreadth doctrine is that it requires 
a court to consider the constitutionality of a statute on its face.  Indeed, a 
finding that a statute is overbroad means that the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face.92  There is no such thing as an as-applied 
                                                 
90 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
91 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990) (quoting Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 
U.S. 576, 581 (1989)).  At some level, the Court’s statements that the overbreadth doctrine is 
an exception to normal rules regarding standing seem to assume that the analysis should 
be conducted pursuant to the Speech Model.  If the analysis is done under the Statutory 
Model, individual assessment of the actual speech involved in each case is not necessary 
once the court is satisfied that the litigant engaged in expressive conduct protected by the 
First Amendment.  Thus, under the Statutory Model, as long as a litigant has engaged in 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, the nature of the court’s analysis 
seems to foreclose a distinction based on different fact patterns.  A litigant whose activity is 
at the margins of First Amendment protection and at the height of the state’s interest in 
regulation would seem to have the same standing, assuming the court uses the Statutory 
Model, to challenge a statute as a litigant whose activity is at the center of First 
Amendment protection and whom the state has little interest in regulating.  In each 
instance, the litigant will benefit the same if the court concludes, pursuant to the Statutory 
Model, that the statute is unconstitutional.  Cf. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 13 (arguing that 
the overbreadth doctrine is not an exception to traditional standing rules and that the 
overbreadth doctrine is best understood as a product of the constitutional requirement that 
one can be punished only by a constitutionally valid rule of law).  Thus, the overbreadth 
doctrine can only be considered an exception to “traditional rules regarding standing” if:  
(1) it is a case where the litigant’s speech has no First Amendment protection, i.e., fighting 
words or obscenity, or (2)  the Speech Model of analysis is used. 
92 See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570–71, 577 (1987) 
(holding that a Los Angeles airport resolution preventing “First Amendment activities” in 
the terminal area is facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine); Gooding, 405 
U.S. at 520 (holding that a statute is unconstitutional on its face if it can be applied to 
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overbreadth challenge, but there are numerous examples where the 
Supreme Court considers a facial challenge to a statute under the First 
Amendment without using the overbreadth doctrine.  Indeed, under the 
Statutory Model of adjudication, a court necessarily considers a statute on 
its face.  In Frisby v. Schultz,93 the Supreme Court considered a facial 
challenge to a town ordinance prohibiting residential picketing.94  The 
Court did not mention the overbreadth doctrine in the opinion.95  
Similarly, in Watchtower Bible,96 the Court struck down a village 
ordinance that required a permit from the mayor before going on 
residential property to promote a “cause.”97  The Court neither used nor 
referred to the overbreadth doctrine. 
Thus, the ability of a court to consider the constitutionality of a 
statute on its face cannot be considered one of the traits or contributions 
of the overbreadth doctrine.  Courts using the Statutory Model can 
examine the constitutionality of a statute on its face without regard to the 
overbreadth doctrine.  However, the overbreadth doctrine does allow 
courts to examine the constitutionality of a statute using the Speech 
Model of adjudication.  That is, the overbreadth doctrine allows a court 
to use a different method of analysis in deciding a facial challenge to a 
statute.  To understand this concept, it is necessary to explore the 
limitation on the overbreadth doctrine that was introduced by the Court 
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.98 
In Broadrick, the Supreme Court considered portions of an Oklahoma 
statute limiting the partisan political activities of state employees.99  
Several Oklahoma state employees had been charged with violating the 
statute by actively participating in an election campaign.100  The 
employees conceded that their activities would not be protected if the 
Court used the Speech Model of adjudication and considered the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied specifically to their speech.101  
                                                                                                             
protected speech); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940) (using the overbreadth 
doctrine to strike down on its face an Alabama prohibition on picketing). 
93 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
94 See id. at 488 (holding that the ordinance was valid because of the state’s “substantial 
and justifiable” interest in protecting the sanctity of the home and because the ordinance 
was narrowly tailored). 
95 See id. at 476–88. 
96 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
97 See id. at 153. 
98 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
99 See id. at 602. 
100 See id. at 609. 
101 See id. at 610. 
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The employees argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the 
overbreadth doctrine because the statute had been construed to apply to 
the displaying of bumper stickers and wearing of political buttons.102  
The Court proceeded to give a short history of the overbreadth 
doctrine,103 calling it “strong medicine” and noting that it had been 
employed “sparingly and only as a last resort.”104  The Court 
acknowledged that applying the statute to wearing buttons and 
displaying bumper stickers might violate the First Amendment,105 but 
the Court refused to strike down the statute on its face.106  The Supreme 
Court stated that in order for an overbreadth challenge to succeed, the 
“overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, 
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”107 
Thus, under Broadrick’s “substantial overbreadth” test, it is not 
sufficient for a litigant to point to one or a few hypothetical fact patterns 
under which application of the statute would be unconstitutional.108  
Broadrick requires a court to attempt to estimate the relationship between 
the circumstances where the statute could be constitutionally applied 
and the circumstances where the statute would be unconstitutionally 
applied.  At some point, if the number of unconstitutional applications, 
compared to the number of constitutional applications, is “substantial,” 
the law is struck down on overbreadth grounds.  The substantial 
                                                 
102 See id. at 609–10. 
103 Some of the citations offered by the Court as examples of the application of the 
overbreadth doctrine do not fit under the modern understanding of the overbreadth 
doctrine.  For example, the Court cites Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), as an 
illustration of the application of the overbreadth doctrine.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973).  However, in Cohen, the Supreme Court found the actual speech used 
by the defendant to be constitutionally protected.  See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26.  Moreover, 
the Court did not strike down the disturbing the peace statute at issue in Cohen.  Rather, it 
simply reversed Cohen’s conviction.  See id. 
104 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
105 See id. at 618. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 615. 
108 The Court’s opinion in Gooding v. Wilson seems to suggest that one unconstitutional 
application was sufficient under the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate the entire statute.  
See 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (“[The statute can] withstand appellee’s attack upon its facial 
constitutionality only if, as authoritatively construed by the Georgia courts, it is not 
susceptible of application to speech . . . that is protected by the [First Amendment].”).  But 
see Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“We have never held that a statute 
should be held invalid on its face merely because it is possible to conceive of a single 
impermissible application, and in that sense a requirement of substantial overbreadth is 
already implicit in the doctrine.”). 
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overbreadth test, then, is an empirical one.109  The court must ponder the 
numerous situations in which the statute in question might be applied, 
weigh the speech and state interests in each fact pattern and “predict” 
how those competing interests would be resolved if actually litigated, 
and then calculate the empirical relationship between the number of 
applications that would be constitutional and those that would be 
unconstitutional. 
In this respect, the substantial overbreadth doctrine is conceptually 
identical to the test used in City of Boerne v. Flores110 for determining 
whether Congress has exceeded its power under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to “enforce” the protections found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.111  Under the Boerne test, the Court identifies 
the nature of the substantive Fourteenth Amendment guarantee at issue, 
delineates the scope of the Congressional act involved, and then 
determines the relationship between applications of the statute under 
which the underlying conduct is constitutionally protected against state 
action and those applications of the statute under which the underlying 
conduct is not constitutionally protected against state action.112  Under 
both the Boerne and substantial overbreadth tests, a court considers the 
constitutionality of the statute on its face based on the number of 
potentially permissible or constitutional applications of the statute 
versus the number of impermissible or unconstitutional applications of 
the statute.113 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 589 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(applying the substantial overbreadth test and attempting to estimate how often the statute 
in question could be applied unconstitutionally to family pictures of naked babies with 
genitals exposed). 
110 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
111 See generally Catherine Carroll, Note, Section Five Overbreadth:  The Facial Approach To 
Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1026, 1034–37 (2003) (arguing that the analysis adopted by the Court in Boerne is identical to 
the substantial overbreadth analysis). 
112 See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2001). 
113 That the substantial overbreadth test is conceptually identical to the Boerne congruent 
and proportional test might be independently sufficient for Justice Scalia to abandon the 
substantial overbreadth test.  In a recent case considering Congress’ power under Section 
Five to enact Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Justice Scalia called for the 
renunciation of the Boerne test except in cases involving racial discrimination: 
The [Boerne] “congruence and proportionality” standard, like all such 
flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-
driven decisionmaking. . . .  As a general matter, we are ill advised to 
adopt or adhere to constitutional rules that bring us into constant 
conflict with a coequal branch of Government.  And when conflict is 
unavoidable, we should not come to do battle with the United States 
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Thus, under the substantial overbreadth test, the court examines the 
constitutionality of the statute on its face but uses the Speech Model of 
adjudication.  The court does not consider the interests supporting the 
statute in a vacuum, striking down the statute if it finds the statute is not 
supported by sufficient policy objections or that the statute might have 
been better drafted.  Rather, the court focuses on how the statute will be 
applied in various hypothetical fact patterns.  The court uses the Speech 
Model of adjudication to resolve the facial challenge to the statute.  This 
is the second aspect or contribution of the overbreadth doctrine.  
Although facial challenges in First Amendment law have been 
ubiquitous through the use of the Statutory Model and the Court has 
frequently used the Speech Model to consider as-applied challenges to 
statutes, the overbreadth doctrine allows a court to entertain a facial 
challenge to the statute while using the Speech Model of adjudication. 
The difference between a facial challenge under the overbreadth 
doctrine using the Speech Model of adjudication and a facial challenge 
using the Statutory Model of adjudication has been explained by 
commentator Marc Isserles as follows: 
[N]ot all facial challenges are alike.  Facial challenges can 
take at least two qualitatively distinct forms.  First, a 
facial challenge may be asserted as an “overbreadth 
facial challenge,” which predicates facial invalidity on 
some aggregate number of unconstitutional applications 
of an otherwise valid rule of law.  Second, and quite 
distinctly, a facial challenge may be asserted as a “valid 
rule facial challenge,” which predicates facial invalidity 
on a constitutional defect inhering in the terms of the 
statute itself, independent of the statute’s application to 
particular cases.114  
Mr. Isserles’s use of the term “overbreadth facial challenge” is 
consistent with a facial challenge using the Speech Model.  His term 
“valid rule facial challenge” is nothing more than a facial challenge 
adjudicated under the Statutory Model. 
                                                                                                             
Congress armed only with a test (“congruence and proportionality”) 
that has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and 
cannot objectively be shown to have been met or failed.  As I wrote for 
the Court in an earlier case, “low walls and vague distinctions will not 
be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.” 
Tennessee v. Lane 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
114 See Isserles, supra note 6, at 363–64. 
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The Supreme Court has articulated the distinction between these two 
different types of facial challenges as follows: 
[T]o prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the challenged law either “could never 
be applied in a valid manner” or that even though it 
may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it 
nevertheless is so broad that it “may inhibit the 
constitutionally protected speech of third parties.”  [T]he 
first kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless the 
court finds that “every application of the statute created 
an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas,” and the 
second kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless 
the statute is “substantially” overbroad. . . .115 
By reading the Court’s explanation of the difference between these two 
types of facial attacks, one might conclude that the main difference in 
these tests is the number of violations needed for a statute to be struck 
down on its face.  Under a facial challenge analyzed pursuant to the 
Statutory Model, a litigant must prove that the statute is unconstitutional 
in every application, but under an overbreadth facial challenge, the 
litigant must prove that the statute is unconstitutional in a certain 
percentage of instances.  This conclusion is incorrect because it assumes 
that a facial challenge outside the context of the overbreadth doctrine is 
analyzed in the same way as an overbreadth challenge.116  This is untrue.  
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a court uses the Speech Model of 
adjudication to consider the various applications of the statute to 
                                                 
115 N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (citations omitted); see 
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 n.3 (1992) (concluding that the facial attack 
asserted in that case was not an overbreadth challenge but a normal facial attack requiring 
the Court to use the Statutory Model of adjudication); cf. Sec’y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson 
Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965 n.13 (1984) (“[T]here is no reason to limit challenges to case-by-case 
‘as-applied’ challenges when the statute on its face and therefore in all its applications falls 
short of constitutional commands.”).  In other instances, the Court has been less articulate 
in describing the difference between the two types of facial challenges.  See, e.g., City 
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984) (“There are two 
quite different ways in which a statute or ordinance may be considered invalid ‘on its 
face’—either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or because it 
seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally 
‘overbroad.’”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982) (“Overbreadth challenges 
are only one type of facial attack.  A person whose activity may be constitutionally 
regulated nevertheless may argue that the statute under which he is convicted or regulated 
is invalid on its face.”). 
116 See Isserles, supra note 6, at 377 (stating that it has been incorrectly assumed “that all 
facial challenges are structured as overbreadth facial challenges”). 
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different factual scenarios.  Under a “normal” facial challenge, that is, a 
facial challenge other than a facial challenge under the overbreadth 
doctrine, a court uses the Statutory Model of adjudication and considers 
the statute generically and without reference to specific fact patterns.117  
It is for this reason that this Article has attempted to clearly describe and 
distinguish between the Speech Model of adjudication and the Statutory 
Model of adjudication.  The difference between an overbreadth facial 
challenge and a normal facial challenge is not the number of violations 
that a litigant must prove to be successful.  Rather, the difference is the 
method of analysis that the court uses in deciding the case.  The Speech 
and Statutory Models describe these two different forms of analysis. 
Thus, to summarize, there are two traits or contributions of the 
overbreadth doctrine.  The first trait is that it allows litigants whose own 
free speech rights have not been violated to nevertheless challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute on its face.  The other trait is that it allows a 
court to consider the constitutionality of a statute on its face using the 
Speech Model of adjudication. 
C. Limitations on the Use of the Overbreadth Doctrine 
In order to complete the description of the overbreadth doctrine, it is 
necessary to briefly note the various limitations that have been placed on 
the doctrine.118  This Part briefly identifies the limitations on the 
overbreadth doctrine developed by the Court. 
Of course, the most substantial limitation on the overbreadth 
doctrine is the requirement that the overbreadth be “substantial” and 
“judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”119  The 
Court first intimated that the “substantial” requirement would only 
apply in cases where “conduct and not merely speech” was involved.120  
However, subsequent cases reveal that the “substantial” requirement 
                                                 
117 See id. at 382 (“[T]he classic understanding of a facial challenge—a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the statute ‘on its face’—has no evident relationship to the overbreadth 
doctrine’s method of aggregating unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid 
rule.”). 
118 See Fallon, supra note 18, at 863 (“More recently, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
have limited the doctrine in various ways . . . .”); Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the 
Burger Court and First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1983) 
(“[T]he Burger Court—quite probably in overreaction to the unbending and unthinking 
protectionism of the Warren Court—introduced stringent general principles of limitation 
on the doctrine’s use . . . .”). 
119 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
120 Id. 
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applies regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, 
speech, or both.121 
The Court has adopted other limitations on the overbreadth 
doctrine.  In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,122 the Court held that the 
overbreadth analysis is inapplicable to commercial speech.123  
Additionally, the Court has stated that before an overbreadth challenge 
will be heard by the courts, it should first be determined whether the 
statute is constitutional as applied to the litigant’s particular speech.124  
Only if the statute is constitutional as applied to the litigant’s particular 
speech may the court consider an overbreadth challenge.125  Along 
similar lines, the Court has refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine 
when the overbreadth claimant has not demonstrated that the relevant 
statute in question applied to speech more deserving of First 
Amendment protection than the claimant’s speech.126 
The Court has twice dealt with the issue of whether an overbreadth 
challenge should be considered when the statute in question has been 
amended.  In Bigelow v. Virginia,127 the Court “declined” to consider an 
overbreadth attack on a statute that was no longer in existence, 
reasoning that the statute could not be applied to other litigants in the 
future and thus did not present a chilling threat to constitutionally 
protected expression.128  However, in Massachusetts v. Oakes,129 a majority 
of the Court determined that it could consider an overbreadth challenge 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) 
(announcing the substantial overbreadth requirement and failing to distinguish between 
cases of speech and conduct); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (also 
announcing the substantial overbreadth requirement and failing to distinguish between 
cases of speech and conduct). 
122 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
123 See id. at 380–81. 
124 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1989). 
125 See id. at 485 (“[T]he lawfulness of the particular application of the law should 
ordinarily be decided first.”). 
126 See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 802 (1984). 
127 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
128 See id. at 817–18.  The Court ultimately concluded that the application of the Virginia 
statute violated Bigelow’s First Amendment rights.  See id. at 829.  Under the rule 
announced in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York  v. Fox, that a court should 
only consider an overbreadth challenge if the statute is constitutional as applied to the 
claimant, the Court should not have considered the overbreadth challenge.  492 U.S. at 484–
85. 
129 491 U.S. 576 (1989). 
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to a statute that had been amended after a prosecution and conviction.130  
The Court distinguished Bigelow in a footnote, triggering sharp criticism 
from the remainder of the Court.131  In light of the conflicting results in 
Bigelow and Oakes, the Court has not conclusively resolved the issue of 
whether an overbreadth challenge can be made to an amended statute. 
Finally, the Court has placed a procedural obstacle to a successful 
overbreadth challenge.  The Court has stated that “[t]he overbreadth 
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, ‘from the text of [the law] 
and from actual fact,’ that substantial overbreadth exists.”132  This 
procedural standard is contrary to other litigation under the First 
Amendment, in which the government is generally required to justify 
infringement on free expression.133 
Thus, the overbreadth doctrine has been considerably limited by 
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the adoption of the doctrine.  In 
order for a court to consider an overbreadth claim, it must first 
determine whether the statute in question is constitutional as applied to 
the claimant.  If it is, the court will not consider the overbreadth 
challenge.  A court cannot consider an overbreadth claim in the context 
of commercial speech.  In addition, it is debatable whether a court can 
consider an overbreadth claim when the statute in question has been 
amended subsequent to the conviction at issue.  If a court does consider 
an overbreadth challenge, it will be the claimant’s burden to show that 
the law is substantially overbroad “‘from actual fact[s].’”134   
II.  DOES THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES? 
Thus far, I have attempted to demonstrate that the overbreadth 
doctrine makes two contributions to free speech jurisprudence.  Having 
identified what the doctrine is, I move to the heart of this Article, that the 
overbreadth doctrine should be abandoned.  In this Part, I examine the 
purported goals of the overbreadth doctrine and determine whether the 
overbreadth doctrine achieves those goals. 
                                                 
130 See Oakes, 491 U.S. at 585–88.  Justice Scalia wrote an opinion stating that the 
subsequent amendment to the statute in question did not foreclose consideration of the 
claimant’s overbreadth argument.  Four other Justices joined this portion of the opinion. 
131 See id. at 587 n.1. 
132 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of 
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (alterations in original)). 
133 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (explaining that it was the state’s 
burden to justify the restriction on free speech). 
134 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122. 
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A. Preventing Chilling of Protected Speech 
The most common contemporary justification for the overbreadth 
doctrine is as follows:  
We have provided this expansive remedy [of the 
overbreadth doctrine] out of concern that the threat of 
enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or “chill” 
constitutionally protected speech—especially when the 
overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions. Many 
persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden 
(and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through 
case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain 
from protected speech, harming not only themselves but 
society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.  Overbreadth adjudication, by 
suspending all enforcement of an overinclusive law, 
reduces these social costs caused by the withholding of 
protected speech.135 
In other words, if a statute can be applied constitutionally in only certain 
situations and if the number of unconstitutional applications of the 
statute are “substantial” in relation to the number of constitutional 
applications, the court will strike down the statute136 because of a fear 
that constitutionally protected speech will be “chilled” if the statute is 
not struck down. 
One will not find this modern, sophisticated justification for the 
overbreadth doctrine in Thornhill v. Alabama,137 the case that both the 
Court and commentators acknowledge as the birth of the doctrine.138  In 
fact, closer examination of the Thornhill opinion indicates that the Court 
was probably not cognizant that it was adopting a new doctrine for 
deciding First Amendment cases, nor did the Court intend to do so in 
that case.  A brief examination of the Thornhill case illustrates the almost 
accidental nature by which the overbreadth doctrine was adopted and 
                                                 
135 See id. at 119 (citations omitted). 
136 Assuming, of course, that the court is presented with a case in which application of 
the overbreadth doctrine is appropriate, i.e., that the statute is constitutional as applied to 
defendant’s conduct and that the statute does not involve commercial speech.  See supra 
Part I.B. 
137 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
138 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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how the modern chilling justification for the overbreadth doctrine is a 
mere post-hoc rationale. 
 In Thornhill, the Supreme Court considered a conviction under an 
Alabama statute that prohibited loitering or picketing near or at a place 
of business.139  The Court in Thornhill announced that the picketing 
statute in question “must be judged upon its face.”140  As support for this 
proposition, the Court reasoned that “[p]roof of an abuse of power in the 
particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the 
constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of 
ideas,”141 citing to several licensing cases in which the Court had struck 
down ordinances requiring permits from local officials before holding 
public meetings or distributing literature.142  The Court’s reliance on 
licensing cases is dubious.  Licensing schemes constitute a prior restraint 
on speech.143  Prior restraints in general, particularly licensing schemes 
leaving broad discretion to the responsible official,144 strike at the heart 
of the First Amendment.145  A prior restraint such as a licensing scheme 
                                                 
139 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91 (1940). 
140 See id. at 96. 
141 See id. at 97. 
142 See id. (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 
(1939), and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)). 
143 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992) (“‘[A] law 
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint’ of a license 
must contain ‘narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.’”). 
144 See S.E. Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).  The Court commented: 
Invariably, the Court has felt obliged to condemn systems in which the 
exercise of such authority was not bounded by precise and clear 
standards.  The reasoning has been, simply, that the danger of 
censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment 
freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a 
forum’s use.  Our distaste of censorship—reflecting the natural distaste 
of a free people—is deep-written in our laws. 
Id. 
145 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).  In Lovell, the 
Court stated: 
The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed 
against the power of the licensor.  It was against that power that John 
Milton directed his assault by his “Appeal for the Liberty of 
Unlicensed Printing.”  And the liberty of the press became initially a 
right to publish “without a license what formerly could be published 
only with one.” 
303 U.S. at 451; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“The main purpose of [the 
freedom of speech and press clauses] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon 
publications as had been practiced by other governments,’ and they do not prevent the 
subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare.”); 
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punishes or restricts speech before the speech reaches the “market place 
of ideas.”146  As such, licensing schemes are always reviewed on their face 
to determine their constitutionality.147  However, Thornhill did not 
involve a prior restraint on speech because it was a case involving 
punishment for speech already expressed.  The Court’s reliance on prior 
restraint licensing cases does little to establish the overbreadth doctrine, 
which is applicable to both pre and post–publication restraints on 
speech.148 
                                                                                                             
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND No. 4 151–52 (1769) (“The 
liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying 
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal 
matter when published.”). 
146 Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraints, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 
657 (1955).  Emerson compares subsequent punishment and prior restraint: 
Under a system of subsequent punishment, the communication has 
already been made before the government takes action. . . .  Under a 
system of prior restraint, the communication, if banned, never reaches 
the market place at all.  Or the communication may be withheld until 
the issue of its release is finally settled, at which time it may have 
become obsolete. 
Id. 
147 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988), where the Court 
justified its review of strict licensing schemes: 
At the root of this long line of precedent is the time-tested knowledge 
that in the area of free expression a licensing statute placing unbridled 
discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a 
prior restraint and may result in censorship.  And these evils engender 
identifiable risks to free expression that can be effectively alleviated 
only through a facial challenge. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
148 It seems likely the Court considered the licensing cases relevant because the statute in 
Thornhill left excessive discretion to law officers to determine whether the picketing 
occurred with the purpose of “hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any 
lawful business or enterprise of another. . . .”  Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91 (1940); 
see also id. at 98 n.11 (noting that although the picketing had taken place for over a month, 
the statute had not been enforced against anyone besides Thornhill, who was the labor 
union president).  Subsequent Supreme Court cases have suggested that the overbreadth 
challenge in Thornhill was permitted because of the discretion given to law enforcement 
officers.  See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movements, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) (citing 
Thornhill for the proposition that “the Court has permitted a party to challenge an 
ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine in cases where every application creates an 
impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly 
broad discretion to the decisionmaker”).  The apparent concern is that officers will use the 
discretion to suppress only unpopular speech and thus engage in viewpoint 
discrimination.  At some level this problem is unavoidable.  However, officer discretion 
and prosecutorial discretion are legitimate function of the Executive Branch.  Although this 
power can be abused, it is equally illegitimate for courts to strike down on its face any 
statute that  has the potential of being enforced in a discriminatory manner.  While officers 
and prosecutors may sometimes abuse their discretion and enforce statutes against 
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Besides the licensing cases the Thornhill Court cited in the opinion, it 
seems that another line of prior restraint cases influenced the Court’s 
judgment in Thornhill:  cases involving broad ranging injunctions against 
labor union activity and picketing.  In the years preceding Thornhill, 
there was intense conflict regarding the right of labor unions to organize, 
strike, and picket.  Initially, employers used suits alleging common law 
conspiracy to break up, punish, and deter picketers.149  As labor became 
more organized and strikes became larger and more coordinated, 
employers discovered that a much more effective tool in combating labor 
was to get a court to issue an injunction against the “interference” of the 
employer’s business.150  Some appellate courts began striking down the 
injunctions if the injunctions were too broad and could be applied to 
legal conduct.151  It is clear that these appellate opinions that struck down 
broad injunctions were influential in framing the issue and analysis 
within Thornhill,152 but this case did not involve a broad injunction 
                                                                                                             
unpopular viewpoints, conviction and punishment takes place within the courts, which 
have the duty to ensure that the defendant’s conduct actually constitutes a violation of the 
law and that the defendant’s conduct is not speech entitled to First Amendment protection.  
Additionally, it should be noted that an officer’s discretion to arrest a speaker after the 
speech has occurred is entirely different than a licensor’s discretion to prohibit speech 
before it takes place.  An arrest and prosecution only result in a conviction after the litigant 
receives an opportunity to argue that the conviction is inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.  This discussion takes place after the speech has occurred and entered the 
market place of ideas.  For this reason, discretion to suppress speech pre-publication is 
much more dangerous than discretion to punish already-spoken speech.  See Emerson, 
supra note 146, at 657 (“Under a system of subsequent punishment, the communication has 
already been made before the government takes action. . . .  Under a system of prior 
restraint, the issue of whether a communication is to be suppressed or not is determined by 
an administrative rather than a criminal procedure.  This means that the procedural 
protections built around the criminal prosecution [are] not applicable to a prior restraint.”). 
149 See Joseph Tenenhaus, Picketing as a Tort:  The Development of the Law of Picketing from 
1880 to 1940, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 170, 172 (1953). 
150 See WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
62–97 (1991); VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER 161 (1993). 
151 See Cummins, supra note 77, at 1676–79 (tracing the emergence of an “overbreadth” 
doctrine against broad labor injunctions).  Labor activities were not originally recognized 
as protected First Amendment activity.  See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 
U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (holding that words in furtherance of a boycott were not protected 
expression).  However, labor activity was legal if the means and the ends were legitimate.  
See Cummins, supra note 77, at 1676.  Thus, a judicial injunction was too broad if it 
prohibited activity that had legitimate ends and means.  See id. at 1677 (discussing various 
appellate cases in which injunctions against labor were struck down because the injunction 
could be applied to labor activity with legitimate means and ends). 
152 See generally Cummins, supra note 77, at 1671–95 (explaining how the previous 
appellate court decisions using overbreadth to strike down broad anti-labor injunctions 
influenced the Court’s thinking when it was presented with a broad anti-labor statute).  For 
instance, the lawyers for Thornhill cited only one case in their appellate brief, a Nevada 
case in which the Nevada Supreme Court had relied almost exclusively on previous 
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against picketing.  Rather, it involved a broad statute against picketing.  
The difference between the two is substantial.  An injunction prohibiting 
expressive conduct is considered a prior restraint,153 which raises special 
constitutional concerns.154  Engaging in speech that violates an injunction 
usually subjects the speaker to automatic punishment, regardless of 
whether the speech was protected under the First Amendment.155 
It is clear that the Thornhill Court had on its collective mind both 
licensing and injunctions, the two recognized forms of prior restraints, 
when it decided the case.  The Court did not appreciate the fundamental 
difference between the pre-speech prohibitions of prior restraints and the 
post-speech punishment imposed by normal statutes like the one in 
Thornhill.156  Additionally, the Court was undoubtedly motivated by the 
                                                                                                             
appellate decisions striking down broad anti-labor injunctions in order to strike down a 
broad anti-labor statute.  See id. at 1692. 
153 See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701–02 (1931) (holding that an injunction 
against the “‘malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other 
periodical’” known as The Saturday Press was unconstitutional). 
154 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.”). 
155 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967) (holding that, unless in 
unusual circumstances where appellate review of an injunction is impossible, speech that 
violates an injunction is punishable regardless of whether the speech might have been 
protected by the First Amendment); see also GTE Sylvania v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 
375, 386 (1980) (“[P]ersons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction 
are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper 
grounds to object to the order.”). 
156 Cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (Douglas, J., concurring) (justifying 
his refusal to follow a previous Supreme Court opinion as follows:  “The ruling was casual, 
almost offhand.  And it has not survived reflection.”).  At some level the justifications for 
the overbreadth doctrine and the hostility towards prior restraints—both licensing schemes 
and broad injunctions—is circular.  The main justification the Supreme Court has given for 
its skeptical attitude towards licensing prior restraints is that such a scheme chills speech:  
“[T]he mere existence of the licensor’s unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of 
prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion 
and power are never actually abused. . . .  [A major First Amendment risk in such schemes 
is] self-censorship by speakers in order to avoid being denied a license to speak.”  City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750, 757–58 (1988).  The same justification has 
been offered for injunction prior restraints.  See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT 61 (1975) (explaining that while “a criminal statute chills” speech, an injunction 
“freezes” speech).  The justification offered for the overbreadth doctrine is the same:  A fear 
that unless the statute is struck down, constitutional speech will be chilled.  See, e.g., 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (“[T]he statute’s very existence may cause 
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or 
expression.”).  In the licensing cases, the fear of chilling is derived partially from the fact 
that the speech can be prohibited before it is spoken.  See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757.  Thus, 
the reason that a court must be concerned with chilling in licensing cases is because it is 
different than a scheme that punishes speech after it occurs.  This makes it difficult to 
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particular facts and equities of the case.  The Court wanted to send a 
message to the industry, which had responded with increased hostility 
towards the appellate courts regarding broad, anti-labor, trial court 
injunctions by shifting forums and getting anti-labor legislation passed 
in the states.157  In addition, the author of the Thornhill opinion, Justice 
Murphy, had long been associated with and supportive of the labor 
movement, and he saw this case as an opportunity to strike a blow for 
labor rights.158  Regardless, the opinion in Thornhill does not contain the 
type of detailed, thoughtful analysis that one would expect from a 
Supreme Court opinion identified as the origin of a doctrine that is a 
radical departure from traditional adjudication, nor does the opinion 
establish the chilling rationale as a justification for the overbreadth 
doctrine.159 
In any event, contemporary justifications for the overbreadth 
doctrine focus primarily on the chilling rationale.  This justification of the 
                                                                                                             
understand why a scheme that punishes post-speech also presents the same concerns.  It 
suggests that the concern with licensing schemes is not simply the fact that it is a pre-
speech prohibition.  The Lakewood Court also expressed concern that the discretion given to 
officials in a licensing scheme might chill speech.  See id.  However, the concern with 
official discretion proves too much in the context of a statute punishing speech after it has 
occurred.  See id.  While officer and prosecutorial discretion might indeed have a chilling 
function on speech, this concern is a product of separating the executive, legislation, and 
judicial functions.  Yet, if the fear of official and prosecutorial discretion justified facial 
invalidity of a statute, no statute that made any sort of expressive conduct a crime could 
survive.  The fear that speech will be chilled in the licensing context is probably best 
explained by a combination of the discretion given to an official and the fact that the official 
receives discretion prior to speech occurring.  Because this combination is not present for 
statutes that punish post-speech and the “discretion” factor, while often present in post-
speech statutes, cannot be the basis of the overbreadth’s concern for chilling, the concern 
that post-speech statutes will chill speech must be derived from other factors. 
157 See Cummins, supra note 77, at 1689 (tracing the reaction of employers to limitations 
on labor injunctions and the effort to pass anti-labor legislation). 
158 See SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN:  THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936–37  311 (1970).  
Justice Murphy viewed the Thornhill case as an opportunity to declare the framework by 
which all picketing cases would be analyzed.  As Justice Murphy explained in a note to 
fellow Justice Huddleston: 
“[O]ur job as I see it . . . is to write a reversal without serious prejudice 
to the police power of the state. . . .  We don’t want to end picketing . . . 
but what about its abuse?  We want above all to preserve the freedoms 
but what about using them as a cloak for activities that are properly 
unlawful?” 
See Cummins, supra note 77, at 1695.  Justice Murphy was apparently satisfied that he had 
done his part to preserve the freedom of picketing, as he wrote “labor’s magna carta” on 
the top of a printed copy of the Thornhill decision.  See id. at 1698.  One cannot help but be 
reminded of the old adage that “hard cases make bad law.” 
159 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610 (stating that the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to 
“traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication”). 
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overbreadth doctrine is based on numerous assumptions.  First, it 
requires that citizens have knowledge of what the law is.  Second, it 
assumes that a citizen who does know the law will refrain from engaging 
in constitutionally protected speech because that speech is prohibited 
under the overbroad statute.  Third, it requires that a citizen be aware of 
court decisions that strike down the law as overbroad.  Fourth, it 
assumes that a citizen, aware of the court decision, will now engage in 
the constitutionally protected speech previously refrained from.  When 
each of these assumptions is critically examined, it is clear that the 
overbreadth doctrine will only operate to prevent the chilling of 
unconstitutional speech in the rare case. 
Of course, whether these assumptions are valid is ultimately an 
empirical question that is not easily quantifiable, but there exist some 
general observations.  In many of the cases in which the overbreadth 
doctrine has been applied, it is doubtful that potential speakers know the 
statute in question, which is the first assumption on which the 
overbreadth doctrine is based.  For example, in Lewis v. New Orleans,160 
the Supreme Court considered an overbreadth challenge to a New 
Orleans ordinance making it a crime to “‘wantonly [] curse or revile or to 
use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any 
member of the city police while in the actual performance of his 
duty.’”161  Lewis had been arrested during the traffic stop of her husband 
for yelling, “you god damn m.f. police—I am going to (the 
Superintendent of Police) about this.”162  It is highly doubtful that Lewis, 
or any other citizen who was engaged in a traffic stop or was in another 
situation in which the ordinance might be violated, knew about the New 
Orleans ordinance.163 
The same can be said for the resolution struck down by the Court in 
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus.164  The Los Angeles Board 
of Airport Commissioners had enacted a resolution declaring that the 
terminal at Los Angeles International Airport was “not open for First 
                                                 
160 415 U.S. 130 (1974). 
161 Id. at 132. 
162 Id. at 131 n.1 (internal quotations marks omitted).  The facts in Lewis were noted only 
in a footnote, which was criticized by the dissent.  See id. at 137 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]t is no happenstance that . . . the facts are relegated to footnote status, conveniently 
distant and in a less disturbing focus.”). 
163 See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 455 (1987) (declaring unconstitutional a 
Houston ordinance making it unlawful to “‘oppose, molest, abuse, or interrupt any 
policeman in the execution of his duty . . .’”). 
164 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
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Amendment Activities. . . .”165  After a “minister” for the nonprofit “Jews 
for Jesus” corporation was asked to refrain from distributing free 
religious leaflets, Jews for Jesus brought suit challenging the 
constitutionality of the resolution.166  Noting that the resolution could be 
applied to such activities as “talking and reading, or the wearing of 
campaign buttons or symbolic clothing,” the Court used the overbreadth 
doctrine to strike down the statute.167 
Undoubtedly, Jews for Jesus and other organizations that desired to 
use the terminal as a place to distribute literate were aware of the law, 
either after they were told to leave by officials or after having learned of 
such an incident.  However, these are not the category of speakers whose 
speech might be chilled by the terminal resolution.  Jews for Jesus, and 
other similarly situated organizations wishing to use the terminal to 
distribute literature, were represented in the actual case before the 
Court.168  Those speakers whose speech might presumably be chilled by 
the resolution, the “talkers” and “readers” mentioned by the Court, 
surely had no idea that there existed a resolution that could be used to 
suppress their activities.169 
                                                 
165 See id. at 570–71. 
166 See id. at 571. 
167 See id. at 575. 
168 The Court avoided many difficult questions, such as whether an airport terminal is a 
traditional public forum, by relying on overbreadth grounds. See id. at 573–74 (“Because we 
conclude that the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine regardless of the proper standard, we need not decide whether LAX 
is indeed a public forum, or whether the Perry standard is applicable when access to a 
nonpublic forum is not restricted.”).  By relying on overbreadth grounds, the Court 
violated the principle established in Fox, that an overbreadth analysis should not be 
performed if the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the overbreadth claimant.  See Bd. 
of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 460, 484–85 (1989). 
169 Jews for Jesus raises another problem with the overbreadth doctrine—the possibility 
that a court will strike down a statute based on hypothetical fact patterns that might 
technically constitute a violation of the law but would not be pursued and prosecuted.  The 
Supreme Court encountered this issue in Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989).  Oakes 
had been arrested for taking “approximately 10 color photographs of his partially nude and 
physically mature 14-year-old stepdaughter.”  Id. at 580.  Oakes was convicted under a 
statute making it a crime to permit a child to “pose or be exhibited in a state of nudity” and 
was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment.  Id. at 579–80.  One issue before the Court was 
whether the statute was unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine because it could 
be applied to parents who take nude pictures of their baby children.  In Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, nude photos of small children were not so common that the statute was 
unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine.  See id. at 589.  However, Justice Scalia 
also noted that a prosecutor would almost never prosecute a family for taking nude 
pictures of their small children:  “We can deal with such a situation in the unlikely event 
some prosecutor brings an indictment.”  Id. 
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Thus, in Jews for Jesus and Lewis, the first assumption required under 
the overbreadth doctrine—that citizens are aware of the statute or 
ordinance in question—is not met.  Although there are other cases in 
which it is more likely that the general population, or at least potential 
speakers, would be aware of a statute attacked under the overbreadth 
doctrine, it seems that there are many instances in which citizens will not 
even know the law in question.  If citizens are not even aware of the 
statute, it cannot be said that the statute will chill constitutional speech. 
The second assumption that is required for the overbreadth doctrine 
to actually prevent chilling of constitutional speech is that a citizen who 
does know the law will refrain from engaging in constitutionally 
protected speech because that speech is prohibited under the overbroad 
statute.  Again, in at least some situations, this assumption seems 
unlikely.  Consider again the fact pattern in Lewis.  It seems highly 
unlikely that a person who is inclined to shout verbal insults at an on-
duty police officer would refrain from doing so simply because of 
knowledge that such conduct is prohibited by law.  Such speech is made 
instinctively and without reflection, often when the speaker is 
experiencing great emotion.  Consider also the Massachusetts statute 
from Oakes,170 which prohibited involvement in the display or 
production of nude photographs of children.171  Although the statute 
technically applied to parents who took nude family photographs of 
their small children,172 it seems highly unlikely that parents, even if they 
were aware of the law, would stop taking pictures of their naked 
babies.173 
In contrast, knowledge of the law would surely cause others to 
refrain from speaking.  Particularly in situations where the speaker had 
time to reflect on the illegality of the speech before speaking, it seems 
that chilling is possible if citizens are, in fact, aware of the law.  For 
example, law-abiding citizens who knew of a ban on First Amendment 
activities in an airport terminal might refrain from wearing political 
buttons supporting a particular candidate.174  Additionally, public 
employees disinclined to fall into the bad graces of their boss might 
                                                 
170 491 U.S. 576 (1989). 
171 See id. at 579. 
172 See id. at 589. 
173 Under the facts in Oakes, parents would not refrain from taking pictures probably 
because they knew that they would never be prosecuted for such activity.  See supra note 
169. 
174 See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 570–71 (1987) (stating that 
the Los Angeles airport terminal was “not open for First Amendment activities . . .”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/4
2005] Broad Attack on Overbreadth 147 
refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech, such as 
wearing a political button or displaying a political bumper sticker, 
pursuant to an overbroad state law regulating the political activities and 
speech of public employees.175  In other circumstances, even if the 
speaker has time to reflect on the speech and the consequences from 
engaging in such speech, the speaker will sometimes engage in speech 
that he or she feels compelled to make.  Gregory Johnson no doubt knew 
that he violated Texas law when he burned the American flag in front of 
the National Convention in 1984.176  Similarly, David O’Brien surely 
realized that he violated a federal prohibition on the intentional 
destruction or mutilation of draft cards when he burned his draft card on 
the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.177 
Thus, the second assumption necessary to the overbreadth 
doctrine—that citizens who know the law will refrain from engaging in 
constitutionally protected speech that violates the law—is not true in 
many situations.  In some situations, such as the Houston ordinance in 
Lewis that prevented cursing at an officer, the emotional impulse by a 
speaker to express frustration with an officer will often override the 
speaker’s knowledge that his or her conduct violates the law.  In other 
situations, such as the Massachusetts statute in Oakes that could be 
applied to family photos of naked babies and toddlers, speakers continue 
to engage in the conduct because they know that they will not be 
prosecuted.  Finally, in some instances, a speaker will engage in speech 
that is prohibited but that the speaker feels is important and perhaps 
constitutionally protected.  This principle is best exemplified by the 
O’Brien and Johnson cases, in which the speakers felt compelled to speak 
despite the likely arrest, prosecution, and conviction that would follow 
his speech.178 
The third assumption necessary for the overbreadth doctrine to 
prevent chilling is that a citizen be aware of court decisions that strike 
down the law as overbroad.  Once again, in many circumstances this 
assumption seems improbable.  A 2002 poll of Americans revealed that 
two-thirds of Americans could not name a single Supreme Court 
                                                 
175 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973) (“[W]e do not believe that [the 
Oklahoma statute] must be discarded in toto because some persons’ arguably protected 
conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.”). 
176 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (reversing Johnson’s conviction under 
Texas law for desecrating a venerated object). 
177 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (upholding O’Brien’s conviction). 
178  Johnson, 491 U.S. 397; O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 
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Justice.179  Even more startling was the fact that over two-thirds could 
not even identify the number of Justices that sit on the Supreme Court, 
even when given an option of “5,” “7,” “9,” “11,” or “I don’t know.”180  If 
Americans are generally unaware of the Justices of the Supreme Court, it 
seems safe to say that they are not faithfully checking the Supreme Court 
website and anxiously waiting for the next slip opinion to be posted.  
This says nothing about the multitude of lower appellate courts 
decisions, both federal and state.  If a federal court of appeals panel 
sitting in Denver, Colorado, strikes down an Oklahoma state law under 
the overbreadth doctrine, is it reasonable to assume that a citizen of 
Lawton, Oklahoma, will be aware of the opinion, much less understand 
the implications on his or her free speech rights? 
My instinct is that the answer to that question will very often be no.  
The courts’ assumption that citizens trace the constitutionality of statutes 
as they make their way through the appellate courts seems fantastical 
and a bit presumptuous.  It is true that certain cases involve activists 
groups, such as the ACLU or pro-life groups, that follow the appellate 
disposition of state and federal statutes.  However, it is more and more 
common for those groups to be a part of the lawsuit in which the statute 
in question is considered.181  Thus, because these groups are parties to 
the lawsuit, they are not the type of unrepresented speaker whose speech 
the overbreadth doctrine is supposed to prevent from being chilled.182 
                                                 
179 See Information Clearing House, Shocking Poll:  Majority of Americans Cannot Name a 
Single Department in the President’s Cabinet (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.informationclearing 
house.info/article5158.htm. 
180 See id. 
181 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 
U.S. 234 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
182 Other commentators have found this assumption hard to believe: 
How many people likely to be involved in this class of cases read the 
statutes and ordinances closely enough to be deterred from 
constitutionally protected speech by an over-broad law, and then 
follow the law reports with such care as to be reassured by a Supreme 
Court decision declaring the law unconstitutional on its face unless 
and until it is saved by a narrowing construction by the State’s highest 
tribunal?  And how many check for narrowing State court 
interpretations? 
ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 45 (1976).  
Cox raises the interesting point that citizens should also be leery of relying on a federal 
appellate court decision striking down a state statute as overbroad because state courts can 
“rescue” an overbroad statute by construing it narrowly.  In most cases, one would think 
that a narrowing state interpretation of the statute would eliminate the speaker’s 
constitutionally protected speech that was prohibited and chilled by the original statute.  
Thus, the speaker would not have to worry about subsequent narrowing interpretations of 
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The final assumption required for the overbreadth doctrine is that a 
citizen, aware of a court decision striking down a statute pursuant to the 
overbreadth doctrine, will now engage in the constitutionally protected 
speech previously refrained from.  Keeping in mind that this is a citizen, 
who was initially aware of the statute in question, refrained from 
speaking because of the statute and has followed the resolution of the 
statute through the appellate court disposition.  It seems reasonable to 
assume that this conscious citizen will now engage in the protected 
speech. 
There are factors that might cause the speaker to pause.  Initially, 
there is no guarantee that the citizen will not be arrested for the speech.  
Although this hypothetical citizen has closely tracked the litigation of the 
statute and carefully read the appellate court’s opinion striking down the 
law, there is no guarantee that local law officials responsible for 
implementing the law, which can still be found on the state books or in 
the state penal code,183 will be as informed.  Of course, the speaker is 
protected from an ultimate conviction, but any speaker engaging in 
constitutionally protected speech will always be protected from 
conviction even if the statute is not struck down using the overbreadth 
doctrine.  The overbreadth doctrine is concerned only with the chilling of 
constitutionally protected speech, speech that could not be the basis of a 
conviction, regardless of whether the court had or had not previously 
declared the statute unconstitutional pursuant to the overbreadth 
doctrine.  Thus, to the extent that speakers still fear arrest for their 
speech even after a court has struck down an overbroad statute, the 
application of the overbreadth doctrine has accomplished nothing in 
terms of preventing the chilling of speech, except perhaps to remove an 
ambiguity regarding the fate of the speaker in the courts following an 
arrest. 
                                                                                                             
the statute because those interpretations would presumably eliminate constitutionally 
protected speech from the parameters of the statute.  However, it is possible to formulate a 
state court interpretation of a statute, declared overbroad by a federal court, that eliminates 
enough unconstitutional applications of the statute to avoid substantial overbreadth but 
nevertheless is applicable to some constitutionally protected speech.  In that scenario, the 
speaker would theoretically still be “chilled” because his or her speech, while protected, is 
still illegal under the most recent interpretation of the statute  given by a state court.  If 
anything, the above digression exemplifies how improbable it is that normal citizens, 
untrained in the law, will engage in conduct that violates a state statute because some 
appellate court has declared the statute overbroad. 
183 See id. at 45 (“Of course, the declaration [that a statute is unconstitutional pursuant to 
the overbreadth doctrine] does not take the statute off the books.”). 
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A good illustration of this scenario is presented in City of Houston v. 
Hill.184  In Hill, the Supreme Court considered an overbreadth attack on a 
Houston ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in his 
or her official duties.185  The Court concluded that the ordinance was 
substantially overbroad and struck it down.186  It is doubtful that this 
decision eliminated the chilling of constitutional speech in this arena.  
First, as was discussed above, someone who is as emotionally charged as 
the defendant in Lewis is likely to verbally assault the police regardless of 
their knowledge of a law prohibiting such conduct.  The converse is also 
true.  Anyone who prefers not to be arrested will probably refrain from 
verbally assaulting a policeman, regardless of whether the speaker 
knows that the statute prohibiting such language has been struck down 
as overbroad by some court and that the statute will not support an 
ultimate conviction.  In these situations, the chilling comes not from the 
threat of conviction but from the threat of arrest, and the overbreadth 
doctrine will not prevent chilling. 
Upon close inspection, it seems unlikely that the overbreadth 
doctrine actually prevents the chilling of constitutionally protected 
speech, except in rare cases.  The answer is ultimately empirical and, 
unfortunately, not easily measurable.  Because the doctrine is a dramatic 
departure from “the traditional rules governing constitutional 
adjudication,”187 it would seem that the burden is on the proponent of 
the application of the doctrine.  The considerable weaknesses exposed in 
this section advise that the chilling theory is not a valid justification for 
the overbreadth doctrine. 
B. Encouraging the Legislature to Carefully Draft Laws  
Although the “chilling” rationale is the most common justification of 
the overbreadth doctrine, there is another argument in favor of the 
doctrine.  According to this argument, the overbreadth doctrine serves 
the valuable purpose of requiring legislators to consider First 
Amendment issues when drafting legislation.  Further, because courts 
have the ability to strike down statutes that are “substantially 
overbroad,” the legislative body will be more cognizant of First 
Amendment rights and will avoid making laws that can be 
unconstitutionally applied in certain circumstances.  Justice Scalia, in a 
                                                 
184 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
185 See id. at 455. 
186 See id. at 471–72. 
187 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). 
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portion of an opinion that four other Justices joined, relied on a version 
of this rationale in Oakes: 
The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect 
constitutionally legitimate speech not merely ex post, that 
is, after the offending statute is enacted, but also ex ante, 
that is, when the legislature is contemplating what sort 
of statute to enact.  If the promulgation of overbroad 
laws affecting speech was cost free, as Justice 
O’Connor’s new doctrine would make it—that is, if no 
conviction of constitutionally proscribable conduct 
would be lost, so long as the offending statute was 
narrowed before the final appeal—then legislatures 
would have significantly reduced incentive to stay 
within constitutional bounds in the first place.188 
This rationale for the overbreadth doctrine relies, like the chilling 
rationale, on the overbreadth doctrine’s effect on third parties—
specifically legislatures.  Like the chilling justification, the legislative-
effect rationale requires numerous assumptions regarding the 
motivations and foundations on which legislators act. 
In a general sense, active judicial review of the constitutionality of 
statutes undoubtedly, on occasion, causes the legislature to pause, 
contemplate, and restrain from enacting legislation that intrudes on the 
personal rights of individuals.  The knowledge that the law they pass 
will be subject to scrutiny by the judicial branch is a good incentive for 
legislators to remain within constitutional bounds. However, to say that 
the overbreadth doctrine itself produces this restraint from the 
legislature might be an overstatement.  As stated in Part I, the 
overbreadth doctrine contributes two additional tools for courts in 
considering the constitutionality of statutes.  First, it dispenses with the 
normal standing requirement that litigants are only allowed to assert 
their own personal constitutional rights.  Second, it allows a court to use 
the Speech Model of adjudication, empirically focusing on the way the 
statute will be applied in various situations.  It seems doubtful that 
legislators are generally aware of these attributes of the overbreadth 
doctrine.  It seems even more doubtful that they exercise additional 
restraint because of these attributes. 
                                                 
188 491 U.S. 576, 586 (1989). 
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Of course, legislators do not necessarily have to be aware of the 
specific functions of the overbreadth doctrine, even of the existence of 
the doctrine, in order for the legislative-effect rationale to have merit.  
One might argue that legislators exercise greater care and precision 
when drafting statutes not because of a precise understanding of the 
attributes of the overbreadth doctrine, but because of a general 
awareness that courts are more frequently striking down legislation 
touching on free speech issues.  The overbreadth doctrine has fostered a 
culture that is protective of speech rights, and because of this culture, 
legislators are generally more apprehensive to pass legislation that might 
intrude on the freedom of speech. 
This is a plausible argument.  However, it is possible to achieve a 
culture that is protective of free speech without the overbreadth doctrine.  
Indeed, I would submit that such a culture presently exists,189 and that is 
has been created without the overbreadth doctrine.  Most “fundamental” 
or “landmark” First Amendment cases have involved actual 
controversies in which a defendant has asserted his or her own rights.  
Neither Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan,190 Cohen v. California,191 Brandenburg 
v. Ohio,192 Texas v. Johnson,193 New York Times v. United States,194 Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent School District,195 nor Hustler Magazine v. Falwell196 
involved the overbreadth doctrine, and these cases are considered some 
of the cornerstones of modern First Amendment free speech analysis.  
These bedrock cases have done more to create a speech-protective 
culture than the handful of relatively minor cases in which the Supreme 
Court has used the overbreadth doctrine to reach its decision.  Moreover, 
when a difficult case involving real issues is litigated, the overbreadth 
doctrine often allows a court to sidestep the important constitutional 
question by focusing instead on an outrageous hypothetical application 
of the statute.197  Thus, in some sense, the overbreadth doctrine permits 
                                                 
189 See Floyd Abrams, Hate Speech:  The Present Implications of a Historical Dilemma, 37 VILL. 
L. REV. 743, 743 (1992) (“Without doubt, American jurists afford far greater protection to 
free expression than exists anywhere else in the world.”). 
190 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
191 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
192 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
193 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
194 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
195 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
196 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
197 For example, in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), 
the Supreme Court used the overbreadth doctrine to avoid the difficult question of whether 
an airport terminal is a public forum.  The Court later concluded that an airport is not a 
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the Court to avoid difficult, real issues that could trigger landmark 
decisions.198  Regardless, the litany of fundamental First Amendment 
cases not involving the overbreadth doctrine demonstrates that the 
doctrine is not absolutely necessary to create a speech-protective culture 
in which the legislature has incentives to avoid the most egregious First 
Amendment violations. 
The overbreadth doctrine is not even necessary for courts to consider 
the constitutionality of statutes on their face.  As detailed in Part I, courts 
have consistently considered the constitutionality of statutes on their face 
without the use of the overbreadth doctrine.199  This analysis occurs 
through the Statutory Model of adjudication.  Under the Statutory Model 
of adjudication, the court asks whether the legislature has pursued an 
appropriate goal and whether it has drafted the statute so that the means 
employed in the statute are adequately tied to the state interest.  The 
analysis is familiar, but it is exclusive and independent of the 
overbreadth doctrine.  Because courts could still review the 
constitutionality of statutes on their face without the overbreadth 
doctrine, the legislature would still have significant incentive to avoid 
unconstitutional litigation. 
Regardless of whether the overbreadth doctrine does, in fact, 
encourage legislators to draft laws with the Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment in mind, it is highly questionable whether courts 
should pursue this goal by altering the “the traditional rules governing 
constitutional adjudication.”200  A determination by the Supreme Court 
that it is to review the constitutionality of congressional statutes 
immediately after becoming law would, of course, provide the 
maximum incentive for Congress to avoid infringing the First 
Amendment when drafting legislation.  However, Article III limits 
federal jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies,” which prevents the 
                                                                                                             
traditional public forum. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 
(1992). 
198 In allowing a court to avoid difficult questions by hypothesizing about other fact 
patterns, the overbreadth doctrine puts the court in a position of making decisions based 
on hypothetical facts that have not occurred in the real world while ignoring the real facts 
that prompted the case before the court.  This result is odd and is certainly no way to 
determine the constitutionality of statutes. 
199 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
200 Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 587 (1989) (Scalia, J., portion of concurring 
opinion in which four other Justices join) (“[I]t seems to me that we are only free to pursue 
policy objectives through the modes of action traditionally followed by the courts and by 
the law.”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). 
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Court from assuming this active role.201  Although the requirement that a 
litigant only assert his or her own constitutional rights is not 
constitutionally-mandated by the “case” or “controversy” requirement of 
Article III,202 there are important objectives achieved by this standing 
requirement: 
Th[is] principle[] rest[s] on more than the fussiness of 
judges. [It] reflect[s] the conviction that under our 
constitutional system courts are not roving commissions 
assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the 
Nation’s laws. . . .  Constitutional judgments, as Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out 
of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases 
between the litigants brought before the Court.203 
It seems impossible that the overbreadth doctrine could trump these 
constitutional “convictions” merely to encourage the legislature to 
refrain from legislation that might be unconstitutional in some 
circumstances.204  As the Court stated in Broadrick, the function of the 
judiciary is to decide cases and controversies.  The judiciary’s role is not 
to pursue policy objectives, but the overbreadth doctrine seems to 
confuse the two.  Of course, it is consistent with the role of Article III 
courts to decide cases and controversies consistent with, and in 
furtherance of, the values expressed by the Bill of Rights.  Yet, when the 
judiciary starts testing the bounds of its constitutional limitations in the 
name of teaching the legislature a lesson, the judiciary seems to forget its 
adjudicatory function and views itself as policymaker.205 
                                                 
201 See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (“This Court, as is the case with all 
federal courts, ‘has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a state or of the 
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the constitution, except as it is called upon 
to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’” (quoting Liverpool v. 
Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))). 
202 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
203 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610–11. 
204  See id. 
205 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Texas v. Johnson is relevant: 
The Court concludes its opinion with a regrettably patronizing civics 
lecture, presumably addressed to the Members of both Houses of 
Congress, the members of the 48 state legislatures that enacted 
prohibitions against flag burning, and the troops fighting under that 
flag in Vietnam who objected to its being burned:  “The way to 
preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those who feel 
differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are 
wrong.”  The Court’s role as the final expositor of the Constitution is 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/4
2005] Broad Attack on Overbreadth 155 
To summarize, the rationale that the overbreadth doctrine 
encourages legislators to draft with care is not particularly strong.  It is 
highly unlikely that the particular attributes of the overbreadth doctrine 
actually cause legislators to be more cognizant of free speech issues.  
Although a general culture that promotes free speech would have a 
restraining effect on legislators, this culture is possible without the 
overbreadth doctrine.  Finally, even assuming that the overbreadth 
doctrine does encourage legislators to consider the First Amendment, the 
judiciary should be very hesitant to pursue such policy goals when the 
means employed stretch constitutional dictates. 
III.  THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE’S EFFECT ON THE ROLE OF COURTS 
Thus far, this Article has identified what the overbreadth doctrine is 
and whether it advances the goals that the doctrine is said to promote.  
My conclusion is that the overbreadth doctrine, at best, marginally 
achieves its goals.  Now, the analysis will turn to the other side of the 
equation:  What are the negative consequences of the doctrine? 
The primary negative consequence of the overbreadth doctrine is 
that it has altered, or at least contributed to altering, the contemporary 
understanding of the role of the judiciary.  More and more, courts are 
perceived as a place where the constitutionality of statutes are decided, 
rather than a place where cases and controversies are adjudicated.  This 
shift in the perception of the judicial role, although probably 
indecipherable to those not intimately familiar with the American 
judicial system, has real-world results.  As a result of this muddling of 
the conventional understanding of the judicial function, the Supreme 
Court has been unable to conclusively resolve recent issues regarding the 
use of facial challenges.  The resolution of these issues requires a clear 
understanding of the judicial function.  Because the overbreadth 
doctrine, particularly the part of the overbreadth doctrine that relaxes 
traditional standing requirements regarding who can bring a facial 
challenge to a statute, has contributed to contemporary confusion over 
the role of the judiciary, the Supreme Court has been unable to 
conclusively resolve these debates, leaving lower federal courts to guess 
at the appropriate solution. 
                                                                                                             
well established, but its role as a Platonic guardian admonishing those 
responsible to public opinion as if they were truant school-children has 
no similar place in our system of government. 
491 U.S. 397, 434–35 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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This Part begins by examining two current questions facing the 
Supreme Court regarding the use of facial challenges.206  I propose that 
the Court has struggled with facial challenges because it lacks a clear 
identification of its function or role.  Having explored the symptoms of 
the problem, I turn to the source of the problem:  the overbreadth 
doctrine.  Using the contemporary writings of Professor Matthew Adler 
as an example, I explain how the overbreadth doctrine has improperly 
altered the conventional understanding of the judicial function, leading 
to the current confusion in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
A. The Contemporary Confusion Over When To Consider the 
Constitutionality of a Statute on Its Face, and What the Standard should Be 
for a Facial Challenge to Succeed 
Much attention has been given recently to the questions of when a 
court should consider the constitutionality of a statute on its face and, 
when it does so, what standard the court should apply.207  Earlier, this 
Article examined the two analyses a court can use when considering a 
facial challenge.  A court can consider a facial challenge to a statute by 
using the Statutory Model of adjudication, or a court can use the Speech 
Model of analysis to dispose of a facial challenge to a statute pursuant to 
the overbreadth doctrine.  However, this descriptive account adds 
nothing to the normative question of when a court should consider a 
facial challenge.  It is imperative to have some understanding of the 
current debate regarding facial challenges to comprehend the negative 
effects of the overbreadth doctrine. 
1. When Should the Court Consider a Facial Challenge? 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tennessee v. Lane208 is a prime 
example of the confusion and disagreement over when to consider the 
constitutionality of a statute on its face.  In Lane, the Court considered 
whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act209 (“ADA”) 
                                                 
206 By doing so, I will briefly leave the First Amendment arena. 
207 See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1321 (“Both within the Supreme Court and among scholarly 
communities, a debate rages over when litigants should be able to challenge statues as 
‘facially’ invalid, rather than merely invalid ‘as-applied.’”); Isserles, supra note 6, at 362 
(“Although both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts repeatedly have applied 
[the] Salerno [standard] in adjudicating facial challenges, some Justices and commentators 
recently have called Salerno’s facial challenge standard into question, criticizing it an 
unnecessary dictum, lacking in precedential authority, and draconian in effect.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
208 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
209 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65 (2004). 
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“exceeds Congress’ power”210 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Title II of the ADA generally requires that States make reasonable 
accommodations for the disabled in all public services.211  Most lower 
courts that had previously confronted the question concluded that Title 
II, on its face, was not a congruent and proportional response to 
unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled, and it was thus 
outside Congress’s power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in that 
Amendment.212  These lower courts reasoned that, although in certain 
contexts Title II could be viewed as a legitimate enforcement of 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights, in the large majority of 
contexts in which Title II applied, the statute required much more than 
what was constitutionally required.213  The lower courts thus concluded 
that Title II was beyond the scope of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.214 
However, the Supreme Court took a different approach in 
considering the constitutionality of Title II in Lane.215  Instead of 
considering the statute on its face by looking at all of the potential 
applications of the statute and all of the constitutional provisions the 
statute might be enforcing, the Court focused narrowly on the specific 
constitutional right the litigants claimed and asked whether Title II was a 
proper enforcement of that particular constitutional right.216  Viewed in 
                                                 
210 541 U.S. at 513. 
211 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2004). 
212 See Timothy Cahill & Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett:  An “As-
Applied” Saving Construction for the ADA’s Title II, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133, 154–56 
(2004) (chronicling the appellate court decisions). 
213 See, e.g., Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Title II’s 
accommodation requirement appears to be an attempt to prescribe a new federal standard 
for the treatment of the disabled rather than an attempt to combat unconstitutional 
discrimination.”). 
214 Cahill & Malloy, supra note 212, at 154–56. 
215 Although the Court framed the issue in Lane as whether Congress had the power to 
enact Title II, a compelling argument can be made that the issue in Garrett, based on the 
motions and pleadings before the Court and the lower court’s judgment, was whether Title 
II is a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.  See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 
509, 513 (2004).  The Court’s decision in Garrett to exclude, in an abrogation analysis, 
evidence of constitutional violations by cities and municipalities when those entities are 
state actors and thus part of the analysis regarding whether Congress had the power to 
enact the statute, as opposed to whether there has been a valid abrogation, dictates that the 
abrogation and Congressional power analyses are slightly different.  See Thompson, 278 F.3d 
at 1032 n.7 (explaining how these analyses differ). 
216 The analysis used was still an overbreadth-type analysis.  However, the Court simply 
limited the number of statutory applications it would consider in conducting the 
“congruence” or “substantially overbroad” analysis. 
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this isolated context, the Court concluded that Title II was valid 
legislation, at least regarding the constitutional right at issue in that case.  
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, 
harshly criticized this “as-applied” approach.  According to the 
dissenters, the proper analysis required the Court to measure “the full 
breadth of the statute or relevant provision that Congress enacted 
against the scope of the constitutional right it purported to enforce.”217 
The Court’s approach in Lane contrasts with the Court’s opinion, 
during the same term, in Ashcroft v. ACLU.218  In Ashcroft, the Court 
considered the constitutionality219 of the Child Online Protection Act220 
(“COPA”), which was Congress’s latest attempt to protect minors from 
sexually explicit material found on the World Wide Web.221  In sharp 
contrast to the Court’s focused analysis in Lane, the Court analyzed the 
statute as a whole.  The Court paid little attention to the specific facts of 
the case, briefly describing the plaintiffs, who were arguing against the 
constitutionality of COPA, as “Internet content providers and others 
concerned with protecting the freedom of speech.”222  It is clear from 
reading the Court’s opinion in Ashcroft that the particular speech 
expressed by the plaintiffs over the Internet was inconsequential to the 
Court’s analysis.  The Court ultimately concluded that COPA was 
unconstitutional because COPA was not the least restrictive means 
available to Congress to achieve its compelling interest in protecting 
minors from sexually explicit materials.223 
                                                 
217 Lane, 541 U.S. at 551–52. 
218 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004). 
219 Actually, the issue before the Court was whether the statute “likely violated” the First 
Amendment.  The case was appealed to the Court from the grant of a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of COPA.  See id. at 2790–91. 
220 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2004). 
221 See Aschcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2790–91. 
222 Id. at 2790. 
223 See id. at 2792–95.  Despite the sweeping breadth and effect of the Ashcroft decision, it 
is important to note that the opinion did not rely on the overbreadth doctrine in reaching 
its decision.  The Court used the Statutory Model of adjudication to conclude that there 
were less restrictive means available to Congress to achieve its goal of protecting children 
from inappropriate Internet material.  See id. at 2792–93.  The Court did not engage in the 
Speech Model of adjudication, which would be applied in the overbreadth analysis, by 
asking how often the statute would be applied unconstitutionally compared to the number 
of times the statute would be applied constitutionally.  Nor was it necessary to invoke the 
overbreadth doctrine because the litigants’ personal constitutional rights were at stake.  
The litigants in Ashcroft were “a diverse group of organizations . . . which post or have 
members that post sexually oriented material on the Web.”  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 
564, 571 (2002).  As such, the litigants had satisfied the personal standing requirement for 
injunction cases because they had a reasonable fear of prosecution under the statute.  See id. 
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Lane and Ashcroft demonstrate that the question of when to analyze a 
statute on its face is not merely an academic question.  In Lane, the Court 
narrowly viewed the legal issue as whether Congress was acting within 
its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and it upheld Title II of 
the ADA under those particular circumstances.  Had the Court focused, 
as Justice Rehnquist suggested in his dissent, on the “full breadth of the 
statute,”224 it seems highly likely that the Court would have concluded 
that Title II exceeded Congress’ power, given that every appellate court 
that framed the issue broadly had struck down Title II.  In Ashcroft, the 
Court focused its analysis on the face of the COPA statute in concluding 
that the statute was unconstitutional; no consideration was given to 
whether the plaintiffs’ Internet speech constituted a violation of the 
statute or whether the plaintiff’s speech was actually protected under the 
First Amendment.  The outcomes of these two cases and, perhaps more 
importantly, the Congressional statutes involved, relied upon the Court’s 
willingness to consider a facial challenge to the statute.225 
2. What Is the Proper Standard When a Facial Challenge Is 
Considered? 
In addition to the confusion over when to apply a facial challenge, 
the Supreme Court also appears conflicted over what standard to apply 
                                                                                                             
at 571.  In fact, in an earlier opinion, the Court rejected an overbreadth attack on COPA.  See 
id. at 584–85. 
224 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 552 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
225 A compelling argument can be made that the Court was wrong in both cases and 
should have considered the constitutionality of Title II on its face while considering COPA 
only as-applied.  In Lane, the issue was congressional power to enact a statute or to 
abrogate through a statute.  When considering the constitutionality of an act of Congress, 
the Court should consider the statute as written.  It defies logic to conclude that Congress 
had the power to enact a statute as applied to certain circumstances but did not have the 
power under different circumstances.  The Court can consider the various circumstances 
under which a statute might apply when determining whether Congress had the power to 
enact the statute, but the Court’s conclusion on the constitutionality of the statute should be 
an up-or-down, broad, facial determination.  To adjudicate otherwise rewrites the statute 
and gives Congress the incentive to enact broad statutes, knowing that the Court’s 
jurisprudence will require the courts to adjudicate the circumstances under which 
Congress can act.  See Lane, 541 U.S. at 552. 
 However, in Ashcroft, the issue was whether First Amendment rights had been or 
would be violated.  As the Court has repeatedly said, First Amendment rights are personal.  
There was no attack to Congress’s power to pass COPA.  The Court should show deference 
to Congress when Congress is acting within its powers, and it should only consider as-
applied challenges to validly enacted legislation.  As such, the Court will be able to 
vindicate personal rights in a concrete setting as cases arise without unnecessarily 
infringing upon Congress’s power to enact legislation. 
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when considering a facial challenge.226  In United States v. Salerno,227 the 
Supreme Court purported to establish or confirm the standard courts 
should use when considering a facial challenge to a statute:  “A facial 
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to 
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”228  Under this 
formulation, as long as there is one set of circumstances in which the 
statute could be applied constitutionally, the statute is not 
unconstitutional on its face. 
There has been much disagreement regarding whether Salerno 
properly articulates, both descriptively and normatively, the standard to 
be applied when considering a facial challenge to a statute.  Justice 
Stevens has written that the Salerno standard is an inaccurate description 
of the standard for facial challenges to statutes, that the standard was 
dicta in the Salerno case, and that it should be ignored by lower courts.229  
In contrast, Justice Scalia has stated that the Salerno standard is a “long 
established principle”230 that has been ignored, improperly and without 
discussion, by the Supreme Court in recent abortion cases.231 
Not surprisingly, commentators are as divided as the Court.  Some 
commentators have argued that the Salerno standard is not a correct 
descriptive claim of how the Supreme Court has traditionally analyzed 
facial challenges, which includes the facial challenge actually considered 
in the Salerno opinion.  Moreover, commentators have stated that the 
Salerno standard is a draconian test that effectively prevents successful 
facial challenges.232  Others have convincingly countered that the Salerno 
standard is the correct standard to be applied when considering most 
facial challenges.233  Nevertheless, it is apparent that confusion currently 
exists regarding the proper standard for a court to apply when a statute 
is challenged on its face. 
                                                 
226 One commentator has stated:  “[I]t is tempting to say that the Justices of the Supreme 
Court are not only divided, but also conflicted or even confused, about when statutes 
should be subject to facial invalidation.”  Fallon, supra note 6, at 1323. 
227 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
228 See id. at 745. 
229 See generally Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175–76 (1996). 
230 Id. at 1178 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
231 See id. at 1178–80. 
232 See Dorf, supra note 7, at 239. 
233 See generally Stuart Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron:  What to Do About Statutory Challenges, 
55 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 443–48 (2003) (explaining that Salerno is the appropriate standard for 
most facial challenges); Isserles, supra note 6, at 359–405 (also explaining that Salerno is the 
appropriate standard for most facial challenges). 
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B. The Function of Courts in American Democracy 
The confusion over when to consider a facial challenge and what 
standard to apply are symptoms of the lack of a clear understanding 
regarding the role of American courts.  If courts were merely bodies in 
which actual disputes are to be resolved, then it would seem that statutes 
need only be struck down on their face if the statute could not be applied 
in the case before the court and the statutory defect prevented any 
constitutional application.234  However, if the proper role of courts is to 
act as a constitutional evaluator of the actions of the executive and 
legislative branches, then a more robust and expansive review of statutes 
seems appropriate.  Of course, a court performs both functions in many 
instances, but the current questions involving facial challenges require a 
definitive choice and an established hierarchy. 
The Constitution strongly suggests that the role of courts is to decide 
actual cases, and the judicial power in Article III extends to “cases” and 
“controversies.”  At the constitutional convention, the framers 
considered the creation of reviewing courts and agencies that would 
have ruled on the constitutionality of statutes without regard to whether 
there was an actual dispute involving the law, but these proposals were 
ultimately rejected in favor of the “case” and “controversy” language 
now found in Article III.235  The Court has extracted various justiciability 
requirements, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness, from the “case” 
and “controversy” limitations.  These justiciability requirements 
presuppose “that a federal judge’s primary function is to resolve 
disputes, not to declare the law.”236 
That the resolution of disputes might sometimes require a 
declaration on the constitutionality of a law does not change the fact that 
the primary function of the judiciary is to resolve disputes.  As the Court 
itself has stated, “[t]he power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws 
unconstitutional is . . . derived from its responsibility for resolving 
                                                 
234 Under this view, statutes would never technically be struck down facially.  Rather, 
they would simply be struck down in the case before the court.  However, a court’s 
analysis in reaching the results in an individual case might mean that future courts would 
be bound by the analysis of the previous opinion striking down the statute. 
235 See generally James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door:  Article III, the 
Injury-In-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1, 57–63 (2001). 
236 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of 
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447–48 (1994). 
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concrete disputes. . . .”237  Thus, although courts are often called upon to 
decide on the constitutionality of statutes, which is indeed one of the 
most important functions of courts, judicial review is merely one of the 
components of the courts’ larger responsibility to resolve actual cases 
and controversies. 
The accepted and established approach, as announced by the 
Supreme Court, is that the ultimate function of courts is to resolve 
disputes.238  However, a competing theory exists.  This competing theory 
is that the primary function of courts is to declare law and repeal or 
amend invalid statutes.  This theory is best articulated in the work of 
Professor Matthew D. Adler.  Under Adler’s theory, the “function of a 
reviewing court is to invalidate (that is, to repeal or amend) rules that are 
invalid.”239  A closer look at Adler’s work clearly illustrates how the 
overbreadth doctrine has contributed to uncertainty over the proper 
judicial function. 
Adler arrives at his conclusion that the function of courts is to 
invalidate rules by first articulating what he terms the “Basic Structure” 
of constitutional rights: 
I will call this structure the “Basic Structure.”  
Constitutional rights are rights against rules.  A 
constitutional right protects the rights-holder from a 
particular rule (a rule with the wrong predicate or 
history); it does not protect a particular action of hers 
from all the rules under which the action falls.  This is, I 
                                                 
237 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 488 (1923).  The court stated: 
The functions of government under our system are apportioned.  To 
the legislative department has been committed the duty of making 
laws, to the executive the duty of executing them, and to the judiciary 
the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought 
before the courts.  We have no power per se to review and annul acts 
of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.  That 
question may be considered only when the justification for some direct 
injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to 
rest upon such an act.  Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining 
and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488. 
238 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1285 (1976) (stating that the “traditional conception of adjudication . . . was the resolution 
of disputes”). 
239 Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication:  A 
Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (2000). 
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should emphasize, a descriptive claim.  My claim is that 
the following description of the current constitutional 
case law, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and 
followed by the lower federal courts, is true: 
constitutional rights are rights against rules.  The Basic 
Structure is our official structure, as constitutional 
doctrine now stands.240 
To illustrate his descriptive claim about the nature of constitutional 
rights, Adler uses the flag-desecration case of Texas v. Johnson.241  Johnson 
had been prosecuted for burning an American flag during a political 
demonstration, which violated a Texas statute prohibiting the 
desecration of an American flag.242  The Court overturned the conviction, 
but it implied that if Johnson had been prosecuted for trespass, 
disorderly conduct, or arson, the First Amendment would not have 
prevented conviction and punishment.243  For Adler, the Johnson opinion 
illustrates that constitutional rights are not “shields” that “protect a 
particular action of hers from all the rules under which the action 
falls.”244  Rather, constitutional rights are simply rights against certain 
types of rules.  If prosecution of an individual is done under an invalid 
rule, the law must be struck down.245 
                                                 
240 Adler, supra note 15, at 3, 8. 
241 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
242 See id. at 399. 
243 See id. at 400. 
244 Adler, supra note 15, at 3. 
245 Adler has later admitted that his Basic Structure—that constitutional rights are rights 
against certain types of rules—is not universally true. See Adler, supra note 239, at 1375 
(“Some kinds of constitutional challenges, even under the Bill of Rights, do not entail the 
existence of a particular type of rule.”).  Adler uses the example of a government official 
torturing an individual.  The torture clearly violates the individual’s constitutional rights 
even though no statute or regulation is involved.  Thus, Adler concedes, not all 
constitutional rights can be characterized as rights against rules because in some cases there 
might not be a statute under which the state action occurred.  See id.  This would seem to be 
a major discredit to Adler’s Basic Structure, but Adler apparently does not conceive it as 
such, stating that his Basic Structure was focused on “substantive challenges to conduct-
regulating rules.”  Id. 
 Even given Adler’s limitation on what he claims to be his focus, which seems illogical 
considering the wide-ranging conclusions he derives at in his Basic Structure and 
Derivative Account, Adler’s Basic Structure is not universally true.  Consider Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell, for an example.  Jerry Falwell brought suit against Hustler Magazine for 
a parody in Hustler belittling and humiliating Falwell.  485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).  The Supreme 
Court considered whether Falwell’s jury verdict against Hustler under Virginia law for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was consistent with the First Amendment.  A fair 
reading of the Court’s opinion illustrates that Hustler’s parody, which the Supreme Court 
analogized to the ubiquitous political parodies throughout American history, was 
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After explaining his “Basic Structure” of constitutional rights, Adler 
sets forth his “Derivative Account” of constitutional adjudication, in 
which the function of a court is to “invalidate (that is, to repeal or 
amend) rules that are invalid.”246  Adler compares his Derivative 
Account with what he terms the “Direct Account,” which is basically the 
view that courts simply resolve disputes and overturn unconstitutional 
convictions.247  Adler acknowledges that the Direct Account is the 
“official view”248 that the “Court officially espouses.”249  However, Adler 
argues in favor of his Derivative Account because it is “morally” 
superior to the Direct Account. 
Regardless of which account of constitutional adjudication is 
“morally” superior, Adler does concede that his theory regarding the 
role of courts must be consistent with Article III of the Constitution, and 
that there exists an argument that his view of the judicial function is 
inconsistent with Article III.  Adler labels these arguments “institutional 
objections.”  In the final section of his article, Rights Against Rules:  The 
Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law,250 Adler attempts to 
respond to the argument that Article III of the Constitution prevents a 
                                                                                                             
constitutionally protected expression, regardless of the statute or rule regulating the 
speech.  To use Adler’s terminology, Hustler enjoyed a constitutional “shield” to publish ad 
parodies of public figures. 
 Adler might respond by questioning whether Hustler’s “shield” would protect them 
from “publishing” the same parody on the wall of a public building such as the Lincoln 
Memorial.  Such an action would clearly violate prohibitions against vandalism and would 
not be protected by the First Amendment.  However, this example demonstrates that at 
some level the problem becomes definitional or semantical.  Adler might respond that the 
vandalism conviction, which would surely be upheld by a court, demonstrates that Hustler 
does not have an unfettered constitutional shield to “publish its parody.”  However, by 
shifting the semantic focus, one could say that Hustler had a constitutional right to publish 
the ad in its own magazine, but that it did not have the right to spray-paint the ad on the 
Lincoln Memorial.  This sort of analysis shifts the focus to the actual speech involved rather 
than the statute in question.  In fact, this analysis represents the Speech Model of 
adjudication rather than the Statutory Model of adjudication.  Thus, Adler’s descriptive 
claim regarding the Basic Structure—that all constitutional rights are rights against rules—
is simply a claim that the Court exclusively uses the Statutory Model of adjudication.  
Although it is true that the Court often uses the Statutory Model, the Speech Model is often 
used, as Part I discussed. 
246 Adler, supra note 239, at 1378.  Adler is making a claim about the function of courts 
only in constitutional cases.  It is important to remember this limitation on Adler’s theory, 
particularly when one considers that a great number of cases in federal courts do not 
involve a constitutional challenge to a statute or regulation. 
247 See Adler, supra note 15, at 39–40. 
248 Id. at 39. 
249 Id. 
250 Adler, supra note 15, at 91. 
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theory that the primary function of courts is to repeal or amend invalid 
rules. 
Adler presents three discernable arguments in support of his 
Derivative Account against the institutional objections.  The first 
argument is based on Owen Fiss’s theory that the “‘function of a judge is 
to give concrete meaning and application to our constitutional values’”251 
rather than resolve disputes.  This “custodial” view of adjudication is 
warranted because common law courts at the time of the framing of the 
Constitution were commonly involved in proceedings far afield from 
typical dispute adjudication:  
The late eighteenth century was the heyday for the 
common law, and . . . the function of courts under the 
common law was paradigmatically not dispute 
resolution, but to give meaning to public values through 
the enforcement and creation of public norms, such as 
those embodied in the criminal law and the rules 
regarding property, contracts, and torts.252   
Thus, according to Adler, to determine the proper bounds of the power 
of federal courts under Article III, we should look to the function of state 
common law courts at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.  
There are numerous problems with this argument.  For purposes of this 
Article, it is sufficient to state that it is illegitimate to compare state 
common law courts, which were most often called upon to determine 
questions of personal liability in the absence of controlling statutory or 
constitutional textual guidance, to modern federal courts, particularly 
when the modern case is one involving the claim that a specific statute 
violates a specific provision of the Constitution. 
Adler’s second argument is that his account of the judicial function 
should be accepted because it better implements the values found in the 
Bill of Rights.253  Article III, according to Adler, should not be interpreted 
in a way that “compromises” the norms expressed in the Bill of Rights.254  
The argument is nearly, if not completely, circular.  Responding to 
criticism that his theory of the function of courts violates the role for 
courts established in Article III, Adler responds that his theory of 
adjudication will better implement constitutional norms.  However, that 
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is not the question raised by his adjudicatory theory.  There is little doubt 
that the Bill of Rights will be better protected if a court declares any 
statute unconstitutional on its face if it might be applied in a manner that 
violates the constitutional rights.  Rather, the question is whether Adler’s 
theory is consistent with Article III.  That his theory better implements 
the Bill of Rights does not answer the critique that his model is outside 
the confines of Article III.  Adler’s argument proves too much.  If his 
argument were true, a constitutional review court, such as the one 
established in Germany or considered and rejected by the founders 
during the constitutional convention,255 would be constitutional because 
it better implements the norms found in the Bill of Rights. 
Adler’s final argument is that his adjudicatory model must be 
consistent with Article III because the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine exists.  Because the overbreadth doctrine allows courts to strike 
down statutes even though the litigant before the court has not been 
deprived of his or her constitutional rights, it cannot be inconsistent with 
Article III for the judicial function to be defined as amending or 
repealing statutes: 
To be sure, [the overbreadth] doctrine is seen as an 
“exception” to the normal type of constitutional right—
the overbreadth litigant is seen to rely, exceptionally, 
upon the moral claims of other persons covered by the 
statute she challenges, rather than upon her own moral 
claims—but my point here is that this purported 
exception must nonetheless be consistent with Article III.  
Exceptional or not, the overbreadth doctrine conceived 
the litigant as holding a legal power to secure the 
invalidation of the rule under which she falls, despite 
the absence of moral reason to protect her.256 
Adler’s last argument is sound:  The overbreadth doctrine, at least 
the relaxed standing component of the overbreadth doctrine, does 
support his conclusion that the Derivative Account is consistent with 
Article III.  However, it is the only argument that Adler advances that 
adequately justifies his judicial function.  There exists an abundance of 
evidence against Adler’s position, including the Supreme Court’s direct 
statement that “[t]he power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws 
unconstitutional is . . . derived from its responsibility for resolving 
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concrete [legal] disputes. . . .”257  Therefore, to assert its validity under 
Article III, Adler’s revolutionary claim about the judicial function rests 
entirely on the overbreadth doctrine.  Adler admits that the overbreadth 
doctrine is an exception to normal constitutional adjudication.  The 
question becomes, then, whether the exception proves the rule. 
Ultimately, I believe it does not.  However, as I stated at the outset of 
this Article, my goal is not to claim that the overbreadth doctrine is 
unconstitutional.  Although I believe that this argument would be 
compelling if the Court were contemplating whether to adopt the 
overbreadth doctrine, such a debate is unwarranted because the doctrine 
has existed for over fifty years.  
My main goal is to urge abandonment of the doctrine.  Along these 
lines, it is relevant that the overbreadth doctrine allows claims, such as 
Adler’s regarding the proper judicial function, to be advanced despite 
their inconsistency with the overwhelming amount of evidence to the 
contrary.  Arguments such as Adler’s confuse the contemporary 
understanding of the judicial function. 
Additionally, it appears that the overbreadth doctrine is beginning to 
spread to other areas of constitutional law beyond the First Amendment.  
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,258 the Court held that a statute regulating 
abortion is unconstitutional if  “in a large fraction of the cases in which 
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
choice to undergo an abortion.”259  Based on this language, 
commentators have declared that the overbreadth doctrine now applies 
to abortion cases.260  Indeed, the Casey test, with its emphasis on the ratio 
of applications in which the law is a “substantial obstacle to a women’s 
choice to undergo an abortion,” appears conceptually similar to the 
requirement under the overbreadth doctrine that a law be 
“substantially” overbroad, meaning that there is an impermissible ratio 
of unconstitutional applications of the statute compared to constitutional 
applications of the statute. The academic literature has generally 
applauded the extension of the overbreadth doctrine into the abortion 
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context261 and even urged its use in still other areas of constitutional 
law.262  The doctrine’s extension to other constitutional areas will only 
exaggerate the confusion that the overbreadth doctrine generates. 
There are direct consequences of this confusion.  The Supreme 
Court’s inability to deal with current issues regarding when facial 
challenges should be applied and what standard to apply when 
considering a facial challenge can be traced to the contemporary 
confusion about the judicial function.  The overbreadth doctrine is partly 
responsible for this confusion.  The abandonment of the doctrine would 
be the first step to clarifying the proper function of the judiciary and 
ending much of the contemporary confusion regarding facial challenges. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should abandon its use of the overbreadth 
doctrine.  The doctrine contributes very little to current First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Although the doctrine is designed to 
prevent the chilling of speech, it will only do so in unusual 
circumstances.  The doctrine is unnecessary to foster a political culture 
that is aware and protective of free speech; this goal can be achieved 
without the overbreadth doctrine.  In addition, the overbreadth doctrine 
has the negative consequence of confusing the contemporary 
understanding of the judicial function.  As such, the overbreadth 
doctrine has contributed to the Court’s inability to conclusively resolve 
persistent questions regarding facial challenges that require a clear 
understanding of the judicial role. 
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